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This paper offers a "panoramic" analysis of the history of financial crises dating from England’s fourteenth-century
default to the current United States sub-prime financial crisis.  Our study is based on a new dataset
that spans all regions.  It incorporates a number of important credit episodes seldom covered in the
literature, including for example, defaults and restructurings in India and China.  As the first paper
employing this data, our aim is to illustrate some of the broad insights that can be gleaned from such
a sweeping historical database.  We find that serial default is a nearly universal phenomenon as countries
struggle to transform themselves from emerging markets to advanced economies.  Major default episodes
are typically spaced some years (or decades) apart, creating an illusion that "this time is different"
among policymakers and investors.  A recent example of the "this time is different" syndrome is the
false belief that domestic debt is a novel feature of the modern financial landscape.  We also confirm
that crises frequently emanate from the financial centers with transmission through interest rate shocks
and commodity price collapses.  Thus, the recent US sub-prime financial crisis is hardly unique. Our
data also documents other crises that often accompany default: including inflation, exchange rate crashes,
banking crises, and currency debasements.
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I.  Introduction 
  The economics profession has an unfortunate tendency to view recent experience in 
the narrow window provided by standard datasets. With a few notable exceptions, cross-
country empirical studies on financial crises typically begin in 1980 and are limited in 
several other important respects.
1 Yet an event that is rare in a three decade span may not 
be all that rare when placed in a broader context. 
This paper introduces a comprehensive new historical database for studying 
international debt and banking crises, inflation, currency crashes and debasements.   The 
data covers sixty-six countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America, and 
Oceania. The range of variables encompasses, among many other dimensions, external and 
domestic debt, trade, GNP, inflation, exchange rates, interest rates, and commodity prices. 
The coverage spans eight centuries, generally going back to the date of independence for 
most countries, and well into the colonial period for some.  As we detail in an annotated 
appendix, the construction of our dataset has built heavily on the work of earlier scholars.  
However, it also includes a considerable amount of new material from diverse primary and 
secondary sources.  In addition to a systematic dating of external debt and exchange rate 
crises, the appendix to this paper also catalogues dates for domestic inflation and banking 
crises.  For the dating of sovereign defaults on domestic (mostly local currency) debt, see 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II summarizes highlights from a first 
view of the extended dataset, with special reference to the current conjuncture.  Among 
other things, we note that policymakers should not be overly cheered by the absence of 
major external defaults from 2003 to 2007, after the wave of defaults in the preceding two 
                                                 
1 Among  many important previous studies include work by Bordo, Eichengreen, Lindert, Morton and Taylor.   2
decades.  Serial default remains the norm, with international waves of defaults typically 
separated by many years, if not decades.  
Many foreign investors and policymakers today seem lulled by the fact that many 
emerging market governments have become less reliant on foreign currency external 
borrowing than in the recent past.  Countries have instead been relying more on domestic 
currency debt issued in local markets. Yet, as we show in a companion paper, reliance on 
domestic debt is hardly new, and the view that domestic debt can be largely ignored in 
looking at external debt sustainability is hard to reconcile with the extensive historical 
experience.
2 
Our dataset reveals that the phenomenon of serial default is a universal rite of 
passage through history for nearly all countries as they pass through the emerging market 
state of development.  This includes not only Latin America, but Asia, the Middle East and 
Europe.  We also find that high inflation, currency crashes, and debasements often go hand-
in-hand with default.  Last, but not least, we find that historically, significant waves of 
increased capital mobility are often followed by a string of domestic banking crises. 
Section III of the paper gives a brief overview of the sample and data.  Section IV 
catalogues the history of serial default on external debts, from England’s defaults in the 
Middle Ages, to Spain’s thirteen defaults from the 1500s on, to twentieth-century defaults 
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  Our database marks the years that default episodes are 
resolved as well as when they began, allowing us to look at the duration of default in 
addition to the frequency. 
Section V of the paper looks at the effect of global factors on sovereign default, 
including commodity prices and capital flows emanating from the center countries.  We 
                                                 
2 These issues are analyzed in detail in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).   3
show how shocks emanating from the center countries can lead to financial crises 
worldwide.  In this respect, the  2007–2008 US sub-prime financial crisis is hardly 
exceptional. 
Section VI shows that episodes of high inflation and currency debasement are just 
as much a universal right of passage as serial default. Section VII introduces a composite 
index that aggregates the “varieties of crises.”  In the concluding section, we take up the 
issue of how countries can graduate from the perennial problem of serial default.  Will the 
early 21
st century prove different? 
Appendix A gives a brief synopsis of how the database was constructed, while 
Appendices I (macroeconomic series) and II (debt) list all the variables in the database and 
provide their sources on a period-by-period and country-by-country basis.  
II. First Insights: The Big Picture 
  What are some basic insights one gains from this panoramic view of the history of 
financial crises?  We begin by discussing sovereign default on external debt (i.e., a 
government default on its own external debt or private sector debts that were publicly 
guaranteed.)  
The first observation is that for the world as a whole (or at least the more than 90 
percent of global GDP represented by our dataset), the current period can be seen as a 
typical lull that follows large global financial crises. 
Figure 1 plots for the years 1800 to 2006 (where our dataset is most complete), the 
percentage of all independent countries in a state of default or restructuring during any 
given year.  Aside from the current lull, one fact that jumps out from the figure are the 
long periods where a high percentage of all countries are in a state of default or 
restructuring.  Indeed, there are five pronounced peaks or default cycles in the figure.      4
The first is during the Napoleonic War. The second runs from the 1820s through the late 
1840s, when, at times, nearly half the countries in the world were in default (including all 
of Latin America).  The third episode begins in the early 1870s and lasts for two decades.   
Figure 1 
Sovereign External Debt: 1800-2006































Sources: Lindert and Morton (1989), Macdonald (2003), Purcell and Kaufman (1993), Reinhart, Rogoff, and 
Savastano (2003), Suter (1992), and Standard and Poor’s (various years). 
Notes: Sample size includes all countries, out of a total of sixty six listed in Table 1, that were independent 
states in the given year. 
 
 
The fourth episode begins in the Great Depression of the 1930s and extends through the 
early 1950s, when again nearly half of all countries stood in default.
3  The most recent 
default cycle encompasses the emerging market debt crises of the 1980s and 1990s.  
 Indeed, when one weights countries by their share of global GDP, as in Figure 2 
below, the current lull stands out even more against the preceding century.  Only the two 
decades before World War I—the halcyon days of the gold standard—exhibited tranquility 
                                                 
3 Kindleberger (1988) is among the few scholars who emphasize that the 1950s can be viewed as a financial 
crisis era.   5
anywhere close to that of the 2003-to-2007 period.
4  Looking forward, once cannot fail to 
note that whereas one and two decade lulls in defaults are not at all uncommon, each lull 
has invariably been followed by a new wave of default.  
Figure 2 is interesting because it shows the years after World War II as marking the 
peak of by far the largest default era in modern world history, with countries representing 
almost 40 percent of global GDP in a state of default or rescheduling.  This is partly a result 
of new defaults produced by the war, but also due to the fact that many countries never 
emerged from the defaults surrounding the Great Depression of the 1930s.
5   By the same 
token, the Napoleonic War defaults become as important as any other period. Outside 
World War II, only the peak of the 1980s debt crisis nears the levels of the early 1800’s. 
As we shall see when we tabulate individual country experiences in Section IV,  
serial default on external debt—that is, repeated sovereign default—is the norm 
throughout every region in the world, even including Asia and Europe. 
                                                 
4 This comparison weights defaulting countries by share of world income.  On an unweighted basis (so, for 
example, the poorest countries in Africa and South Asia receive the same weight as Brazil or the United 
States), the late 1960s until 1982 had an even lower percentage of independent countries in default. 
5 Kindleberger (1989) emphasizes the prevalence of default after World War II, though he does not provide 
quantification.   6
Figure 2 
 
Sovereign External Debt: 1800-2006







































































Sources: Lindert and Morton (1989), Macdonald (2003), Maddison (2003), Purcell and Kaufman (1993), 
Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003), Suter (1992), and Standard and Poor’s (various years). 
Notes: Sample size includes all countries, out of a total of sixty six listed in Table 1, that were independent 
states in the given year. Three sets of GDP weights are used, 1913 weights for the period 1800–1913, 1990 
for the period 1914–1990, and finally 2003 weights for the period 1991–2006. 
 
We have already seen from Figure 2 that global conflagration can be a huge factor 
in generating waves of defaults.  Our extensive new dataset also confirms the prevailing 
view among economists that global economic factors, including commodity prices and 
center country interest rates, play a major role in precipitating sovereign debt crises.
6  
We take up this issue in Section V.  Making use of a range of real global commodity price 
indices, we show that over the period 1800 to 2006, peaks and troughs in commodity price 
cycles appear to be leading indicators of peaks and troughs in the capital flow cycle, with 
troughs typically resulting in multiple defaults. 
                                                 
6 See Bulow and Rogoff (1990), and Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (2006).   7
An even stronger regularity found in the literature on modern financial crises (e.g., 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999 and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008b) is that countries 
experiencing sudden large capital inflows are at a high risk of having a debt crisis.  The 
preliminary evidence here suggests the same to be true over a much broader sweep of 
history, with surges in capital inflows often preceding external debt crises at the country, 
regional, and global level since 1800 if not before. 
Also consonant with the modern theory of crises is the striking correlation between 
freer capital mobility and the incidence of banking crises, as illustrated in Figure 3.  
Periods of high international capital mobility have repeatedly produced international 
banking crises, not only famously as they did in the 1990s, but historically.  The figure 
plots a three-year moving average of the share of all countries experiencing banking crises 
on the right scale.  On the left scale, we employ our favored index of capital mobility, due 
to Obstfeld and Taylor (2003), updated and backcast using their same design principle, to 
cover our full sample period.  While the Obstfeld–Taylor index may have its limitations, 
we feel it nevertheless provides a concise summary of complicated forces by emphasizing 
de facto capital mobility based on actual flows.  
The dating of banking crises episodes is discussed in detail in the Appendix.  What 
separates this study from previous efforts (that we are aware of) is that for so many 
countries, our dating of crises extends back to far before the much-studied modern post– 
World War II era; specifically we start in 1800.  (See Table A.3 for details.)  Our work was 
greatly simplified back to 1880 by the careful study of Bordo, et al. (2001)—but for the 
earlier period we had to resort to archeological work. The earliest advanced economy 
banking crisis in our sample is Denmark in 1813; the two earliest ones we clock in 
emerging markets are India, 1863 and Peru 10 years later.   8
Figure 3 
















































Sources:   Bordo et al. (2001), Caprio et al. (2005), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Obstfeld and Taylor 
(2004), and these authors. 
Notes: As with external debt crises, sample size includes all countries, out of a total of sixty six listed in 
Table 1 that were independent states in the given year. On the right scale, we updated our favorite index of 
capital mobility, admittedly arbitrary, but a concise summary of complicated forces.  The smooth red line 
shows the judgmental index of the extent of capital mobility given by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003), backcast 
from 1800 to 1859 using their same design principle. 
 
(The aforementioned Peruvian case comes from a little-known 1957 book published in 
Lima by Carlos Camprubi Alcazar entitled Historia de los Bancos en el Peru, 1860–1879.  
There are many more such case studies in our references that were a vital source of 
information on banking crises.) 
  As noted, our database includes long time series on domestic public debt.
7   
Because historical data on domestic debt is so difficult to come by, it has been ignored in 
the empirical studies on debt and inflation in developing countries.  Indeed, many generally 
knowledgeable observers have argued that the recent shift by many emerging market 
                                                 
7 For most emerging market economies, over most of the time period considered, domestically issued debt 
was in local currency and held principally by local residents.  External debt, on the other hand, was typically 
in foreign currency, and held by foreign residents.    9
governments from external to domestic bond issues is revolutionary and unprecedented.
8  
As we shall argue, nothing could be further from the truth, with implications for today’s 
markets and for historical analyses of debt and inflation. 
Until very recently, domestic debt was not on the radar screen of the multilateral 
institutions. Neither the International Monetary Fund nor the World Bank systematically 
collected such data.  In fact, cross-country historical time series on domestically issued debt 
are also absent from private data collections.  Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), with 
extensive help from IMF staff and country sources, put together an annual series going 
back to 1990 for a limited number of emerging market countries.
9   
The topic of domestic debt is so important, and the implications for existing 
empirical studies on inflation and external default are so profound, that we have broken out 
our data analysis into an independent companion piece (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).  Here, 
we focus on a few major points.  The first is that contrary to much contemporary opinion, 
domestic debt constituted an important part of government debt in most countries, 
including emerging markets, over most of their existence.  Figure 4 plots domestic debt as 
a share of total public debt over 1900 to 2006.  
For our entire sample of sixty-six countries, domestically issued debt averages more 
than 50 percent of total debt for most of the period.  (This figure is an unweighted average 
of the individual country ratios.)  Even for Latin America, the domestic debt share is 
typically over 30 percent and has been at times over 50 percent.   
Furthermore, contrary to the received wisdom, this data reveal that a very 
important share of domestic debt—even in emerging markets— was long-term maturity 
                                                 
8 See the IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2007; many private investment-bank reports also 
trumpet the rise of domestic debt as a harbinger of stability.   
9 Since then, Jeanne and Guscina (2008) have extended them both back to 1980 and up to 2005.     10
      
Figure 4 
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Sources: The League of Nations, the United Nations, and others sources listed in Appendix II.  
 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2008a).  In that paper, we also present a variety of evidence to 
support the view that, at the very least, domestic debt does not appear to be junior to 
external debt, even factoring in a government’s ability to default via inflation.   
  As payments on domestic debt must come from the same revenue stream as 
payments on foreign debt, the implication is that the extent of domestic debt can be quite 
important in assessing the sustainability of a country’s external debt payments.  Yet, 
because it has not been possible to obtain extensive historical time series on domestic debt 
until now, most empirical researchers have ignored the issue entirely.  Reinhart and Rogoff 
find that the same issue arises in the analysis of high inflation; most of the empirical 
literature since Cagan’s classic (1956) paper has focused on the “seignorage” gains from 
inflation, which are entirely levered off the real money base.  Yet, the government’s gain 
to unexpected inflation often derives at least as much from capital losses that are 
inflicted on holders of long-term government bonds.  Figure 5 on inflation and external   11
default (1900–2006) illustrates the striking correlation between the share of countries in 
default on debt at one point and the number of countries experiencing high inflation (which 
we define to be inflation over 20 percent per annum).  Since World War II, inflation and 
default have gone hand-in-hand. 
Figure 5 
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Sources:  For share of countries in default, see Figure 1; for high inflation episodes, see Appendix I. 
Notes: Both the inflation and default probabilities are simple unweighted averages. 
 
  The forgotten history of domestic debt has important lessons for the present.  As we 
have already noted, most investment banks, not to mention official bodies such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have argued that even though total 
public debt remains quite high today (early 2008) in many emerging markets, the risk of 
default on external debt has dropped dramatically, especially as the share of external debt 
has fallen.  This conclusion seems to be built on the faulty premise that countries will treat 
domestic debt as junior, bullying domestics into accepting lower repayments or simply   12
defaulting via inflation.  The historical record, however, suggests that a high ratio of 
domestic to external debt in overall public debt is cold comfort to external debt holders.   
Default probabilities probably depend much more on the overall level of debt.  Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008b) discuss the interesting example of India, who in 1958 rescheduled its 
foreign debts when it stood at only1/4 percent of revenues. The sums were so minor that 
the event did not draw great attention in the Western press.  The explanation, as it turns out, 
is that India at this time had a significant claim on revenue from the service of domestic 
debt (in effect the total debt-to revenue ratio was 4.4.  To summarize, many investors 
appear to be justifying still relatively low external debt credit spreads because “This time is 
different” and emerging market governments are now relying more on domestic public 
debt.  If so, they are deeply mistaken. 
  Another noteworthy insight from the “panoramic view” is than that the median 
duration of default spells in the post–World War II period is one-half the length of what 
it was during 1800–1945 (3 years versus 6 years, as shown in Figure 6). 
The charitable interpretation of this fact is that crisis resolution mechanisms have 
improved since the bygone days of gun-boat diplomacy.  After all, Newfoundland lost 
nothing less than her sovereignty when it defaulted on its external debts in 1936 and 
ultimately became a Canadian province; Egypt, among others, became British 
“protectorates” following their defaults.  A more cynical explanation points to the 
possibility that, when bail-outs are facilitated by the likes of the International Monetary 
Fund, creditors are willing to cut more slack to their serial-defaulting clients.  The fact 
remains that, as Bordo and Eichengreen (2001) observe, the number of years separating 
default episodes in the more recent period is much lower.  Once debt is restructured,   13
countries are quick to releverage (see Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) for empirical 
evidence on this pattern).  
Figure 6 
Duration of Default Episodes: 1800-2006
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Sources: Lindert and Morton (1989), Macdonald (2003), Purcell and Kaufman (1993), Reinhart, Rogoff, and 
Savastano (2003), Suter (1992), Standard and Poor’s (various years) and authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  The duration of a default spell is the number of years from the year of default to the year of 
resolution, be it through restructuring, repayment, or debt forgiveness. The Kolmogorov–Smirnoff test for 
comparing the equality of two distributions rejects the null hypothesis of equal distributions at the 1% 
significance level. 
 
III. A Global Database on Financial Crises with a Long-term View 
In this section, we provide a slim outline of the character of the sample and the 
building blocks of this database.  Extensive detail is provided in three appendices. 
Country coverage 
 Table 1 lists the sixty-six countries in our sample.  Importantly, we include a large 
number or Asian and African economies, whereas previous studies of the same era 
typically included at most a couple of each.  Overall, our dataset includes thirteen African   14
countries, twelve Asian countries, nineteen European countries, eighteen Latin American 
countries, plus North America and Oceana. 
As the final column in Table 1 illustrates, our sample of sixty-six countries indeed 
accounts for about 90 percent of world GDP.  Of course, many of these countries, 
particularly those in Africa and Asia, have become independent nations only relatively 
recently (column 2).  These recently independent countries have not been exposed to the 
risk of default for nearly as long as, say, the Latin American countries, and we will have to 
calibrate our inter-country comparisons accordingly.
10 
Table 1 flags which countries in our sample may be considered default virgins, at 
least in the narrow sense that they have never failed to meet their debt repayment or 
rescheduled.  One conspicuous grouping of countries includes the high-income 
Anglophone nations, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  (The mother 
country, England, defaulted in earlier eras as we shall see.)  Also included are all of the 
Scandinavian countries, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark.  Also in Europe, there is 
Belgium.  In Asia, there is Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Korea.  
Admittedly, the latter two countries, especially, managed to avoid default only through 
massive International Monetary Fund loan packages during the last 1990s debt crisis and 
otherwise suffered much of the same trauma as a typical defaulting country.  
Also, of default-free countries, only Thailand existed as an independent state before 
the end of World War II.  For others, the potential opportunity for default has been 
relatively short.  Lastly, several of the sovereign default virgins, notably the United States, 
qualify as such only because we are excluding events such as lowering the gold content of 
                                                 
10 Our sample excludes many of the world’s poorest countries, who by and large cannot borrow meaningful 
amounts from private sector lenders, and who have virtually all effectively defaulted even on heavily 
subsidized government-to-government loans.  This is an interesting subject for another study, but here we are 
mainly interested in financial flows that, at least in the first instance, had a substantial market element.   15
the currency in 1933, or the suspension of convertibility in the nineteenth-century Civil 
War. Finally, there is one country from Africa, Mauritius, which has never defaulted or 
restructured.  It is notable that the non-defaulters, by and large, are all hugely successful 
growth stories. This begs the question: Do high growth rates help avert default, or does 
averting default beget high growth rates?   
Table 1 also flags which countries in our sample have not defaulted on their 
external debts, at least in the narrow sense that they have not outright failed to meet their 
debt repayment on schedule in an important way on even one occasion.  This is an issue we 
will return to in Section IV. 
 Dates and Frequency of Coverage 
Appendix A describes the data in detail, while Appendices I and II provide specifics 
on coverage and sources on a country-by-country and  period-by-period basis for all the 
time series. All the data is annual—this includes the crises dates.  Below we provide a list 
of the variables used in this study. 
Crises-related variables 
Debt  
Our debt data covers central government public debt—external and domestic. The 
latter is decomposed into short-term and long-term debt in many, but not all, cases.  For a 
large number of countries the time series go back to the 1800s, if not earlier. However, 
starting in 1913, the coverage for our sample becomes much more comprehensive.  Debt is 
perhaps the most novel feature of the dataset.   16
Table 1. Countries, Regions, and World GDP 
 
Country (An asterisk 
denotes no sovereign 
default or rescheduling 
history) 
 
Year of Independence 
 
 
Share of World Real GDP 
1990 International Geary–Khamis US dollars 
   1913  1990 
Africa     
Algeria 1962  0.23  0.27 
Angola 1975  0.00  0.03 
Central Africa Republic  1960  0.00  0.01 
Cote D’Ivoire  1960  0.00  0.06 
Egypt 1831  0.40  0.53 
Kenya 1963  0.00  0.10 
Mauritius *  1968  0.00  0.03 
Morocco 1956  0.13  0.24 
Nigeria 1960  0.00  0.40 
South Africa  1910  0.36  0.54 
Tunisia 1591/1957  0.06  0.10 
Zambia 1964  0.00  0.02 
Zimbabwe 1965  0.00  0.05 
Asia     
China 1368  8.80  7.70 
Hong Kong *       
India 1947 7.47  4.05 
Indonesia 1949  1.65  1.66 
Japan 1590  2.62  8.57 
Korea *  1945  0.34  1.38 
Malaysia *  1957  0.10  0.33 
Myanmar 1948  0.31  0.11 
Philippines 1947  0.34  0.53 
Singapore *  1965  0.02  0.16 
Taiwan *  1949  0.09  0.74 
Thailand *  1769  0.27  0.94 
Europe     
Austria 1282  0.86  0.48 
Belgium *  1830  1.18  0.63 
Denmark *  980  0.43  0.35 
Finland *  1917  0.23  0.31 
France 943  5.29  3.79 
Germany 1618  8.68  4.67 
Greece 1829  0.32  0.37 
Hungary 1918  0.60  0.25 
Italy 1569 3.49 3.42 
Netherlands *  1581  0.91  0.95 
Norway *  1905  0.22  0.29 
Poland 1918  1.70  0.72 
Portugal 1139  0.27  0.40 
Romania 1878  0.80  0.30 
Russia 1457  8.50  4.25 
Spain   1476  1.52  1.75 
Sweden   1523  0.64  0.56 
Turkey   1453  0.67  1.13 
United Kingdom *  1066  8.22  3.49 
 
Sources:  Correlates of War (2007), Maddison (2004).  
Notes: An asterisk denotes no sovereign external default or rescheduling history.    17
 
Prices 
The data on prices is the most comprehensive in our set of variables, going back to 
the early Middle Ages for Europe (including Turkey) and Asia.  For the New World (the 
United States and some of the larger Latin American countries), these data go back to the 
1700s. Where possible, we use consumer prices (or cost-of-living) indices. On the basis of 
this data, we construct the inflation series that allow us to date inflation crises. 
Table 1 (concluded) Countries, Regions, and World GDP 
 
 
Year of Independence    Share of World Real GDP 
         1 9 9 0   I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
        Geary–Khamis  US  dollars 
   1913  1990 
Latin America     
Argentina 1816  1.06  0.78 
Bolivia 1825  0.00  0.05 
Brazil 1822  0.70  2.74 
Chile 1818 0.38  0.31 
Colombia 1819  0.23  0.59 
Costa Rica  1821  0.00  0.05 
Dominican Republic  1845  0.00  0.06 
Ecuador 1830  0.00  0.15 
El Salvador  1821  0.00  0.04 
Guatemala 1821  0.00  0.11 
Honduras 1821  0.00  0.03 
Mexico 1821  0.95  1.91 
Nicaragua 1821  0.00  0.02 
Panama 1903  0.00  0.04 
Paraguay 1811  0.00  0.05 
Peru 1821 0.16 0.24 
Uruguay 1811  0.14  0.07 
Venezuela 1830  0.12  0.59 
North America     
Canada *  1867  1.28  1.94 
United States *  1783  18.93  21.41 
Oceania     
Australia *  1901  0.91  1.07 
New Zealand *  1907  0.21  0.17 
Total Sample-66 countries    
93.04    89.24 
  
Sources: Correlates of War (2007), Maddison (2003). 
   18
Exchange rates 
Exchange rates in this database come in two forms: For the pre-1600s period, 
exchange rate data are constructed from the silver content of the currency, for which we 
have data through the mid-1800s for 11 countries; beginning in the early 1600s, the Course 
of the Exchange in Amsterdam established actual market-based exchange rates, marking 
the beginning of modern exchange rates, for which we have a far more comprehensive 
coverage.  As in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), we use market-based exchange rates, where 
possible.  These data underpin our dating of currency crashes. 
Varieties of Crises: Banking, and external and domestic default 
These time series are dichotomous variables that take on the value of one if it is a 
crisis year and zero otherwise and are standard in the literature on crisis.  Particulars of the 
criteria used to define a banking crisis or an external or domestic default crisis are given in 
Appendix A. 
 Government Finances, Trade, and GDP 
Our dataset incorporates data on central government expenditures and revenues. On 
the whole, these provide some of the most reliable data on country size and economic 
strength in the era prior to development of conventional national income.  Furthermore, 
these data are available for many countries, including African countries (where data is 
relatively scarce), throughout most of their colonial history.  
The trade data (exports and imports) are next in reliability to the fiscal data.  Like 
their fiscal counterparts, these data offer longer history than the national accounts that are 
of a relatively more modern vintage. 
Having reasonably accurate output data is thus of enormous help in calibrating the 
severity of crises.  Unfortunately, GDP data for most countries prior to the twentieth   19
century are quite uneven.  For many emerging markets, data are only available sporadically 
and at long intervals, which is especially limiting in trying to assess the impact of crises.  
Fortunately, we do have reliable estimates for a sufficient number of countries so as to be 
able to draw broad conclusions and, of course, we can use government revenue and trade 
data to supplement these estimates, as discussed in Appendix A. 
The primary use of the revenue, exports, and GDP series in our analysis is to scale 
debt, that is to construct the standard debt-to-revenues, etc., ratios. 
Capital Flows 
Pre–World War II gross capital flows are measured by data on debentures.  Where 
possible, we also reconstruct net flows by taking gross new issuance minus repayment, 
taking into account partial defaults and negotiated interest rate reductions that often take 
place during rescheduling episodes.  For the post-war, we rely on the actual balance-of-
payments data, as reported by the multilateral institutions or the country sources.  
Financial center data and global commodity prices 
In modern times, emerging market financial crises have often been triggered by 
events at the center, as Bulow and Rogoff (1990) and others have argued.  To capture 
developments in financial centers post-1800, we include: measures of short- and long-term 
interest rates, real GDP, and current account balances. During most of the nineteenth 
century, Britain was the global financial center.  Since World War II, it has been the United 
States, but both countries were influential during the long transition period from British to 
U.S. financial hegemony. 
Commodity prices have long been thought to be another important global driver of 
the depression–prosperity cycles in modern times.  Our historical dataset combines several 
different indices of commodity prices, with the oldest dating back to 1790.     20
IV. Serial Default 1350–2006 
When one looks carefully, virtually all countries have defaulted at least once and 
many several times on external debt during their emerging market economy phase, a period 
that typically takes at least one or two centuries.   
Early Default, 1500 –1799 
Today’s emerging markets can hardly claim credit for inventing serial default. 
Table 2 lists the number of defaults, including default years, between 1300 and 1799 for a 
number of now rich European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Portugal, and Spain).  
As the table illustrates, today’s emerging market countries did not invent serial default.  
Rather, a number of today’s now-wealthy countries, had similar problems when they were 
“emerging markets.”  
 
Spain’s defaults establish a record that remains as yet unbroken.  Indeed, Spain 
managed to default seven times in the nineteenth century alone, after having defaulted six 
times in the preceding three centuries.   





Years of default 
 
Number of defaults 
   
    
Austria 1796  1 
England 1340,  1472,  1594*  2* 
France 1558,  1624,  1648 




Germany (Prussia)  1683  1 
Portugal 1560  1 
Spain 1557,  1575,  1596, 




Sources: MacDonald (2006), Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and sources cited therein. The “*” for 
England denotes our uncertainty at this time about whether its default was on domestic or external debt.    21
With its later string of nineteenth-century defaults, Spain took the mantle for most 
defaults from France, which had abrogated its debt obligations on eight occasions between 
1500 and 1800.  Because the French monarchs had a habit of executing major domestic 
creditors during external debt default episodes (an early form of “debt restructuring”), the 
population came to refer to these episodes as “bloodletting.”
11 The French Finance Minister 
Abbe Terray, who served from 1768–1774, even opined that governments should default at 
least once every 100 years in order to restore equilibrium (Winkler, p. 29).
12    
   Remarkably, however, despite all the trauma the country experienced in the wake of 
the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, France eventually managed to emerge 
from its status of serial default.  France did not default after 1812 in the nineteenth or 
twentieth century nor (so far, anyway) in the twenty-first century. There is, however, some 
debate as to whether France and others defaulted on a portion of their World War I debts to 
the United States. 
13  Austria and Portugal defaulted only once in the period up to 1800, but 
then each defaulted a handful of times during the nineteenth century, as we shall see.   
  England, however, is perhaps an even earlier graduate.  Edward III, of Britain, 
defaulted on debt to Italian lenders in 1340 (see, for example, MacDonald, 2007), after a 
failed invasion of France that set off the Hundred Years’ War.  A century later, Henry VIII, 
in addition to engaging in an epic debasement of the currency, seized all the Catholic 
Church’s vast lands. While not strictly a bond default, such seizures, often accompanied by 
executions, qualify as reneging on financial obligations.   
                                                 
11 See Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) who thank Harald James for this observation. 
12 One wonders if Thomas Jefferson read those words, in that he subsequently held that “the tree of liberty 
must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.” 
 
13 See Lloyd (1934).   22
Sovereign Defaults, 1800–2006 
  Starting in the nineteenth century, the combination of the development of 
international capital markets together with the emergence of a number of new nation states, 
led to an explosion in international defaults.  Table 3 lists nineteenth-century default and 
rescheduling episodes in Africa, Europe and Latin America. We include debt 
reschedulings, which the international finance theory literature rightly categorizes as 
negotiated partial defaults (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989).  We briefly digress to explain this 
decision, which is fundamental to understanding many international debt crisis episodes. 
Reschedulings constitute partial default for two reasons.  The first reason, of course, 
is that debt reschedulings often involve reducing interest rates, if not principle.  Second, 
and perhaps more importantly, international debt reschedulings typically saddle investors 
with illiquid assets that may not pay off for decades.  This illiquidity is a huge cost to 
investors, forcing them to hold a risky asset, often with compensation far below market.  It 
is true that in some cases, investors that held defaulted sovereign debt for a sufficient 
number of years—sometimes decades—have often yielded a return similar to investing in 
relatively riskless financial center bonds (U.K. or later U.S.) over the same period.  Indeed, 
a number of papers have been written showing precisely such calculations (e.g., Mauro, 
Sussman and Yaffa, 2006).   
While interesting, it is important to underscore the fact that the right benchmark is 
the return on high-risk illiquid assets, not highly liquid low-risk assets.  It is no coincidence 
that in the wake of the US sub-prime mortgage debt crisis of 2007, sub-prime debt sells at 
steep discount relative to the expected value of future repayments.  Investors rightly believe 
that if they could pull out their money, they could earn a much higher return elsewhere in 
the economy provided they are willing to take illiquid positions with substantial risk.  And   23
of course they are right.  Investing in risky illiquid assets is precisely how venture capital 
and private equity, not to mention university endowments, have succeeded (until now) in 
earning  enormous returns.  By contrast, debt reschedulings at negotiated below-market 
interest rates give the creditor risk with none of the upside of say, a venture capital 
investment.  Thus the distinction between debt reschedulings—negotiated partial 
defaults—and outright defaults (which typically end in partial repayment) is not a sharp 
one. 
Table 3 also lists each country’s year of independence.  Most of Africa and Asia 
was colonized during this period, allowing Latin America and Europe a substantial head 
start.  The only African countries to default during this period were Egypt (1876) and 
Algeria (1867).  Austria defaulted a remarkable 5 times, albeit not quite so prolific as 
Spain..  Greece, which gained its independence only in 1829, made up for lost time by 
defaulting four times.  Default was similarly rampant throughout the Latin American 
region, with Venezuela defaulting six times, and Costa Rica, Honduras, Colombia and the 
Dominican Republic each defaulting four times. 
 Looking down the columns of Table 3 also gives us a first glimpse at the clustering 
of defaults across regions and internationally.  Note that a number of countries in Europe 
defaulted during or just after the Napoleonic wars, while many countries in both Latin 
America (plus their mother country Spain) defaulted during the 1820s. Most of these 
defaults are associated with Latin America’s wars of independence.   Although none of the 
subsequent clusterings is quite so pronounced in terms of number of countries, there are 
notable global default episodes during the late 1860s up to the mid-1870s, and again 
starting in the mid-1880s through the early 1890s.  We will later look at this clustering a bit 
more systematically.     24
 
Table 3.  External Default and Rescheduling:  






  1800–1824 1825–1849 1850–1874 1875–1899 
 
Africa 
    
Egypt, 1831     1876 
Tunisia    1867   
Europe      
Austria–Hungary 1802,  1805,  1811, 
1816 
 1868   
France 1812       
Germany      
   Hesse  1814       
   Prussia  1807, 1813       
   Schleswig–          
Holstein 
   
1850 
 
   Westphalia  1812       
Greece, 1829   1826,  1843  1860  1893 
Netherlands 1814       
Portugal     1828, 1837, 1841, 
1845 
1852 1890 
Russia   1839    1885 
Spain  1809, 1820  1831, 1834  1851, 1867, 1872  1882 
Sweden 1812       
Turkey     1876 
Latin America      
Argentina, 1816   1827    1890 
Bolivia, 1825     1875 
Brazil, 1822     1898 
Chile, 1818   1826    1880 
Colombia, 1819   1826  1850,  1873  1880 
Costa Rica, 1825   1828  1874  1895 
Dominican 
Republic, 1845 
  1872  1892,  1897,  1899 
Ecuador,  1830   1826  1868  1894 
El Salvador, 1821   1828    1898 
Guatemala, 1821   1828    1876,  1894,  1899 
Honduras, 1821   1828  1873   
Mexico, 1821   1827,  1833,  1844  1866  1898 
Nicaragua, 1821   1828    1894 
Paraguay, 1811    1874  1892 
Peru, 1821   1826    1876 
Uruguay, 1811     1876,  1891 
Venezuela,  1830    1826, 1848  1860, 1865  1892, 1898 
 
1 The dates are shown for those countries that became independent during the nineteenth century. 
Sources: Standard and Poor’s, Purcell and Kaufman (1993), Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and sources 
cited therein. 
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Next we turn to the twentieth century.  Table 4 shows defaults in Africa and Asia, 
including among the many newly colonized countries.  Nigeria, despite its oil riches, has 
defaulted a stunning five times since achieving independence in 1960, more than any other 
country over the same period.  Indonesia has also defaulted four times.  Morocco, counting 
its first default in 1903 during an earlier era of independence, also defaulted four times in 
the twentieth century.  India prides itself on escaping the 1990s Asian crisis (thanks to 
massive capital controls and financial repression).   In point of fact, it was forced to 
reschedule its external debt three times since independence, albeit not since 1972.  While 
China did not default during its communist era, it did default on external debt in both 1921 
and 1939. 
Thus, as Table 4 illustrates, the notion that countries outside Latin American and 
low-income Europe were the only ones to default during the twentieth century is an 
exaggeration, to say the least.  
Table 5 looks at Latin America and Europe, regions where, with only a few 
exceptions, countries were independent throughout the entire twentieth century.  Again, as 
in the earlier tables, we see that country defaults tend to come in clusters, including 
especially the period of the Great Depression, when much of the world went into default, 
the 1980s debt crisis, and also the 1990s debt crisis. The latter crisis saw somewhat fewer 
technical defaults thanks to massive intervention by the official community, particularly by 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  Whether these massive 
interventions were well advised is an entirely different issue that we will set aside here.  In 
Table 5, notable are Turkey’s five defaults, Ecuador and Peru’s six defaults, and Brazil’s 
seven.   26
So far we have focused on number of defaults, but there is some arbitrariness to this 
measure.  Default episodes can be connected, particularly if debt restructuring terms are  
 
harsh and make relapse into default almost inevitable.  We have tried in Table 4 to exclude 
obviously connected episodes, so that when a follow-on default occurs within two years of 
an earlier one, we count it as one episode.  However to gain further perspective into 
countries default histories, we look next at the number of years each country has spent in 
default since independence.





  1900–1824 1925–1949 1950–1974 1975–2006 
 
Africa 
    
Algeria, 1962     1991 
Angola, 1975     1985 
Central African 
Republic, 1960 
   1981,  1983 
Cote D’Ivoire, 
1960 
   1983,  2000 
Egypt     1984 
Kenya, 1963     1994,  2000 
Morocco, 1956 1903      1983,  1986 
Nigeria, 1960     1982,  1986,  1992, 
2001, 2004  
South Africa, 1910     1985,  1989,  1993 
Zambia, 1964     1983 
Zimbabwe, 1965    1965  2000 
Asia      
China  1921 1939    
Japan   1942     
India, 1947    1958,  1969,  1972   
Indonesia, 1949    1966  1998,  2000,  2002 
Myanmar, 1948     2002 
Philippines, 1947     1983 
Sri Lanka, 1948     1980,  1982 
 
 
1 The dates are shown for those countries that became independent during the twentieth century. 
Sources: Standard and Poor’s, Purcell and Kaufman (1993), Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and sources cited 
therein. 
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We begin by tabulating the results for Asia and Africa in Table 6.  Table 6 gives, 
for each country, the year of independence, the total number of reschedulings (using our 
measure) and the share of years since 1800 (or since independence, if more recent) spent in 
a state of default or rescheduling.  It is notable that, while there are many defaults in Asia, 






  1900–1824 1925–1949 1950–1974 1975–2006 
 
Europe 
    
Austria   1938,  1940     
Germany   1932,  1939     
Greece   1932     
Hungary, 1918   1932,  1941    
Poland, 1918   1936,  1940   1981 
Romania   1933    1981,  1986 
Russia 1918      1991,  1998 
Turkey  1915  1931, 1940    1978, 1982 
Latin America      
Argentina    1951,  1956  1982,  1989,  2001 
Bolivia   1931    1980,  1986,  1989 
Brazil  1902, 1914  1931, 1937  1961, 1964  1983 
Chile   1931 1961,  1963,  1966, 
1972, 1974 
1983 
Colombia 1900  1932,  1935     
Costa  Rica  1901 1932 1962 1981,  1983,  1984 
Dominican 
Republic 
 1931   1982,  2005 
Ecuador  1906, 1909, 1914  1929    1982, 1999 
El Salvador  1921  1932, 1938     
Guatemala   1933    1986,  1989 
Honduras     1981 
Mexico  1914 1928   1982 
Nicaragua 1911,  1915  1932    1979 
Panama, 1903   1932    1983,  1987 
Paraguay  1920 1932   1986,  2003 
Peru   1931 1969 1976,  1978,  1980, 
1984 
Uruguay  1915 1933   1983,  1987,  1990, 
2003 
Venezuela     1983,  1990,  1995, 
2004 
 
1 The dates are shown for those countries that became independent during the twentieth century. 
Sources: Standard and Poor’s, Purcell and Kaufman (1993), Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and sources 
cited therein.   28
the typical default was resolved relatively quickly.   Only Indonesia, India, China and the 
Philippines spent more than 10 percent of their independent lives in default (though of 
course on a population-weighted basis, that is most of the region).  Africa’s record is much 
worse, with several countries spending roughly half their time in default.  Certainly, one 
main reason why African defaults are less celebrated than, say, Latin American defaults, is 
because the debts of African countries have typically been relatively small, and the 
systemic consequences less. 
Table 6.  The Cumulative Tally of Default and Rescheduling: Africa and Asia, 




Year of Independence 
 
Share of years in default 
or rescheduling since 
independence or 1800 
1 
 





   
Algeria  1962 13.3  1 
Angola 1975  59.4  1 
Central African 
Republic 
1960 53.2  2 
Cote D’Ivoire  1960 48.9  2 
Egypt 1831  3.4  2 
Kenya  1963 13.6  2 
Mauritius 1968  0.0  0 
Morocco 1956  15.7  4 
Nigeria  1960 21.3  5 
South Africa  1910 5.2  3 
Tunisia 1591/1957  5.3  1 
Zambia  1964 27.9  1 
Zimbabwe  1965 40.5  2 
Asia     
China 1368  13.0  2 
Hong Kong    0.0  0 
India  1947 11.7  3 
Indonesia  1949 15.5  4 
Japan 1590  5.3  1 
Korea 1945  0.0  0 
Malaysia 1957  0.0  0 
Myanmar  1948 8.5  1 
Philippines  1947 16.4  1 
Singapore 1965  0.0  0 
Sri Lanka  1948 6.8  2 
Taiwan 1949  0.0  0 
Thailand 1769  0.0  0 
 
1 For countries that became independent prior to 1800 the calculations are for 1800–2006. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations, Standard and Poor’s, Purcell and Kaufman (1993), Reinhart, Rogoff and 
Savastano (2003) and sources cited therein.  29
  Table 7 gives the same set of statistics for Europe and Latin America.  Greece, as 
noted, spent more than half the years since 1800 in default.  A number of Latin American 
countries spent roughly 40 percent of their years in default, including Mexico, Peru, 
Venezuela, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, and Cost Rica.   
One way of summarizing the data in Tables 6 and 7 is by looking at a time line 
giving the number of countries in default or restructuring at any given time.  We have 
already done this in Figure 1 in section II.  These figures, in which spikes represent a surge 
in new borrowers, illustrate the clustering of defaults in an even more pronounced fashion 
than our debt tables that mark first defaults. 
     The same is true across countries, although there is a great deal of variance, 
depending especially on how long countries tend to stay in default (compare serial-debtor 
Austria, which has tended to emerge form default relatively quickly, with Greece, which 
has lived in a perpetual state of default).  Overall, one can see that default episodes, while 
recurrent, are far from continuous.  This wide spacing no doubt reflects adjustments debtors 
and creditors make in the wake of each default cycle.  For example, today, many emerging 
markets are following quite conservative macroeconomic policies.  Over time, though, this 
caution usually gives way to optimism and profligacy, but only after a long lull. 
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Table 7. The Cumulative Tally of Default and Rescheduling: Europe, Latin America, North America, and 




Year of Independence 
 
Share of years in default 
or rescheduling since 
independence or 1800 
1 
 
Total number of defaults 
and/or reschedulings 
 
Europe     
Austria 1282  17.4  7 
Belgium 1830  0.0  0 
Denmark 980  0.0  0 
Finland 1917  0.0  0 
France 943  0.0  8 
Germany 1618  13.0  8 
Greece 1829  50.6  5 
Hungary 1918  37.1  7 
Italy 1569  3.4  1 
Netherlands 1581  6.3 1 
Norway 1905  0.0  0 
Poland 1918  32.6  3 
Portugal 1139  10.6  6 
Romania 1878  23.3  3 
Russia 1457  39.1  5 
Spain 1476  23.7  13 
Sweden 1523  0.0  0 
Turkey 1453  15.5  6 
United Kingdom  1066  0.0  0 
Latin America        
Argentina  1816 32.5  7 
Bolivia 1825  22.0  5 
Brazil 1822  25.4  9   
Chile  1818 27.5  9   
Colombia 1819  36.2  7 
Costa Rica  1821 38.2  9   
Dominican Republic  1845  29.0  7  
Ecuador  1830 58.2  9 
El Salvador  1821  26.3  5  
Guatemala 1821  34.4  7 
Honduras 1821  64.0  3 
Mexico 1821  44.6  8 
Nicaragua 1821  45.2  6 
Panama 1903  27.9  3 
Paraguay 1811  23.0  6 
Peru 1821  40.3  8 
Uruguay 1811  12.8  8 
Venezuela 1830  38.4  10   
North America     
Canada 1867  0.0  0 
United States  1783  0.0  0 
Oceania     
Australia 1901  0.0  0 
New Zealand  1903  0.0  0 
     
1 For countries that became independent prior to 1800 the calculations are for 1800–2006. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations, Standard and Poor’s, Purcell and Kaufman (1993), Reinhart, Rogoff and  
Savastano (2003) and sources cited therein.   31
V.  Global Cycles and External Defaults 
  As Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) have demonstrated for the post-war 
period, and Aguirre and Gopinath (2007) have recently modeled, emerging market 
borrowing tends to be extremely pro-cyclical.  Favorable trends in countries’ terms of trade 
(meaning typically, high prices for primary commodities) typically lead to a ramp-up of 
borrowing that collapses into defaults when prices drop.  The upper panel of Figure 7 is an 
illustration of the commodity price cycle, which we split into two periods, the pre– and 
post–World War II periods.  As the figure broadly suggests for the period 1800 through 
1940, (and as econometric testing corroborates), spikes in commodity prices are almost 
invariably followed by waves of new sovereign defaults.  The lower panel of Figure 7 
calibrates the same phenomenon for the 1990s and 2000s.  We note that while the 
association does show through in the pre–World War II period, it is less compelling 
subsequently.   
As observed earlier, defaults are also quite sensitive to the global capital flow cycle.  
When flows drop precipitously, more countries slip into default.  Figure 8 documents this 
association by plotting the current account balance of the financial center (the United 
Kingdom and the United States) against the number of new defaults prior to the breakdown 
of Bretton Woods.  There is a marked visual correlation between peaks in the capital flow 
cycle and new defaults on sovereign debt.  The financial center current accounts capture 
“global savings glut” pressures, as they give a net measure of excess center-country 
savings, rather than the gross measure given by the capital flow series in our dataset. 
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Sources:  Boughton (1991), The Economist, Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz (1953), World Economic Outlook, 
IMF and the authors’ calculations based on the sources listed in Table AI.9. For external default, see 
Appendix I. 
Notes: New external defaults refer to the first year of default. Because of the marked negative downward drift 
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Figure  8 















































UK  and US Current account  balance, 
3-year sum as a percent of GDP
(right axis)
Number of new defaults 
3-year sum
 
Sources: Historical Statistics of the United States (2007), Imlah (1958), Mitchell (1993), Bank of England. 
Notes: The current account for the UK and the US is defined according to the relative importance (albeit in a 
simplistic arbitrary way) of these countries as the financial centers and primary suppliers of capital to the rest 
of the world: 1800–1913 UK receives a weight of 1 (US, 0); 1914–1939 both countries’ current accounts are 
equally weighted; post-1940, US receives a weight equal to 1. 
 
We recognize that the correlations captured by these figures are merely illustrative, 
and different default episodes involve many different factors.  But aside from illustrating 
the kind of insights one can get from such a long and broad dataset, the figures do bring 
into sharp relief the vulnerabilities of emerging markets to global business cycles.  The 
problem is that crisis-prone countries, particularly serial defaulters, tend to over-borrow in 
good times, leaving them vulnerable during the inevitable downturns.  The pervasive view 
that “this time is different” is precisely why it usually isn’t different, and catastrophe 
eventually strikes again. 
  The capital flow cycle illustrated in Figure 8 comes out even more strikingly in 
many individual country graphs, but we do not have space here to include these. An early   34
example, though, is illustrated in Figure 9, based on seventeenth-century Spain.  The figure 
illustrates how defaults often follow in the wake of large spikes in capital inflows. 
Figure 9 
Spain: Defaults and Loans to the Crown, 1601-

























Defaults of 1607, 1627, and 
1647
 
Sources: Gelabert (1999a and b), European State Finance Database. 
Crises Emanating from the Center 
We have already seen that major global spikes in defaults began in the 1820s, the 
1870s, the 1930s and the 1980s.  The 1930s spike was caused by the worldwide depression 
that, by most accounts, began in the United States.  So, too, did the 1980s spike, which was 
caused by U.S. disinflation.  What of earlier eras?  Tables 8 and 9 give a thumbnail 
summary of events, showing how the 1825 crisis began with a financial crisis in London 
that spread to Europe, causing global trade and capital flows to plummet.  This summary of 
events, of course, is silent as to the magnitude of the international transmission channel, but 
the tables are nevertheless illustrative of some of the common shocks that might have 
sparked the commodity and capital flow cycles seen in the figures in the preceding    35
 
sections.  Other examples where crises in the center lead to global financial crises include 
the German and Austrian stock market collapse of 1873 (which has been studied by 
Eichengreen in several contributions) and, of course, the Wall Street stock market crash of 
1929.  It is also notable that crises in the center do not always lead to full-blown global 
financial crises, as illustrated by the Barings crisis of 1890 (where the repercussions were 




Origin of the shock: 
country and date 
 
 







London, 1825–1826  Major commercial and 
financial crises in London 
during 1825–26, which 
spread to continental 
Europe.  Trade and capital 
flows with Latin America 
plummet.    
Upon Peru’s 1826 
default, London bond 
holders immediately 
become concerned 
about other Latin 
American countries’ 
ability to service their 
debts; bond prices 
collapse.     
Chile and Gran Colombia 
(which comprised today’s 
Colombia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela) default later 
in the year.  By 1828, all 
of Latin America, with 
the exception of Brazil, 
had defaulted.  
German and Austrian 
stock markets collapse, 
May 1873 
French war indemnity paid 
to Prussia in 1871 leads to 
speculation in Germany and 
Austria.  As far as the 
periphery is concerned, the 
world recession (1873–
1879) results in a dramatic 
fall in trade and capital 
flows originating in the 







Capital flows to the 
U.S. fall in the wake of 
German crisis 
(Kindleberger 1989).  
Ensuing world 
recession (1873–1879) 
leads to debt servicing 
problems in the 
periphery through 
reduced exports and tax 
revenues.  Initial 
defaults in small 
Central American 
nations in January 1873 
leads to a fall in bond 
prices.     
Crisis spreads quickly to 
Italy, Holland, and 
Belgium, leaps the 
Atlantic in September and 
crosses back again to 
involve England, France, 
and Russia (Kindleberger, 
2000).   By 1876, the 
Ottoman Empire, Egypt, 
Greece, and 8 Latin 





Baring Crisis, 1890 
 
Argentina stops dividend 
payments in April 1890, 
leading to a domestic bank 
run.  The House of Baring, a 
major lender to Argentina, 
declares itself insolvent in 
November 1890.  
 
Strong economic links 
between Britain and 




Crisis mostly confined to 
Argentina and Uruguay 
(which defaulted in 1891). 
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mainly felt by Argentina and Uruguay), as well as by the US stock market crash and bank 
runs of 1907, which transmitted mainly to Germany, France and Italy. 
 
Domestic Debt 
  So far, we have focused on external debt crises, but not yet looked at domestic debt 
buildups. 
  Some have argued that external defaults are less likely in the present period because 
governments are now relying more on domestic debt.  For example, in 2001 to 2005, 
domestic government debt in Mexico and Colombia accounted for more than 50 percent of 
total debt, as opposed to less than 20 percent in the early 1980s.  But this is not new.  In 
1837, in the midst of one of Mexico’s longer default spells, domestic debt amounted to 64 
percent of total public debt.  The earliest year where our dataset has domestic debt statistics 
for Colombia is 1923, when domestic debt accounted for 54 percent of total debt.  During 
the same year, domestic debt accounted for 52 percent of Brazil’s debt and 63 percent of 
Peru’s debt.  The 1920s, of course, was a period prior to the massive wave of external 
defaults in the 1930s, a fact that ought to be looked at more closely by those who believe 
that the recent shift by emerging markets towards domestic debt, and away from external 
debt, somehow provides strong protection to creditors.  
Figure 10 makes this point more systematically by examining the behavior of 
domestic and external sovereign debt in the run-up to default.  The bars give the average 
experience of both types of debt, normalized by their levels four years prior to the credit 
event.  As can be seen, both components rise rapidly, at about the same rates, just before 
default.   37
But domestic debt buildups often happen in the aftermath of external default, 
precisely because countries have difficulty borrowing abroad.  Figure 11 illustrates the case 
of China, which had a massive run-up in domestic debt following its default of 1921.   38
Figure 10 
The Runup in Domestic and External Debt






























Sources:  See Appendix I and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a). 
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1921-1936
The default of 
1939-1949 
 
Sources: Cheng (2003), Huang (1919), UN and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: For 1895–1915 the debt stock is calculated from domestic debentures data. According to Huang, 
China did not have domestic debt prior to its 1895 domestic issue. 
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We have already acknowledged that domestic debt is not equivalent to foreign debt, 
nor should it be treated as such.  But we have also established that domestic debt has long 
been fully as significant as external debt in meeting emerging market financing needs.  
There is nothing “original” about it.  And as we show in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a), 
defaults on domestic debt appear to be associated with similar magnitudes of output loss as 
defaults on external debt. 
VI. Default through inflation 
  If serial default is the norm for a country passing through the emerging market state 
of development, then the tendency to lapse into periods of high and extremely high 
inflation is an even more striking common denominator.  No emerging market country in 
history, including the United States (whose inflation rate exceeded 20 percent during the 
country’s 1860s civil war) has managed to escape bouts of high inflation.   
Of course, the problems of external default, domestic default and inflation are all 
integrally related. A government that chooses to default on its debts can hardly be relied on 
to preserve the value of its country’s currency.   Money creation and interest costs on debt 
all enter the government’s budget constraint and, in a funding crisis, a sovereign will 
typically grab from any and all sources.  
  In this section, we give an overview of results from our annual cross-country 
database on inflation going back to 13
th-century Europe. We are only able here to give a 
helicopter tour (so to speak) of our entire cross-country inflation dataset which, to our 
knowledge, spans considerably more episodes of high inflation and across a broader range 
of countries than any existing. 
  Although some writers seem to believe that inflation only really became a problem 
with the advent of paper currency in the 1800s, students of the history of metal currency   40
will know that governments found ways to engineer inflation long before that.  The main 
device was through debasing the content of the coinage, either by mixing in cheaper 
metals, or by shaving down coins and reissuing smaller coins in the same denomination.  
Modern currency presses are just a more technologically advanced and more efficient 
approach to achieving the same end. 
  Tables 9 and 10 give data on currency debasement across a broad range of 
European countries during the pre–paper currency era, 1228–1799.  The table illustrates 
how strikingly successful monarchs were at implementing inflationary monetary policy.  
Sweden achieved a debasement of 41 percent in a single year (1572), while the UK 
achieved a 50 percent debasement in 1551; Turkey’s debasement was 44 percent in 1586.     
The second column of the table looks at cumulative currency debasement over long 
periods, often adding up to 50 percent or more.  Table 10 looks at the same statistics for 
European countries during the nineteenth century, where outliers include Austria’s 55 
percent debasement in 1812, and Russia’s 57 percent in 1810, both in the aftermath of the 
Napoleonic War.  Turkey, in 1829, managed to reduce the silver content of its coins by 50 
percent.   
The pattern of sustained debasement emerges strikingly in Figure 12, which plots 
the silver content of an equally weighted average of the European currencies in our early 
sample (plus Russia and Turkey).  “The March Toward Fiat Money” shows that modern 
inflation is not as different as some might believe.   41
Figure 12. 
The March Toward Fiat Money: Europe 1400-1850




















in 1812 Austria debases 
currency by 55%
 
Sources:  Primarily Allen and Unger and other sources listed in Table AI.4.   
Notes: In the cases where there is more than one currency circulating in a particular country (in Spain, for 
example, we have the New Castille maravedi and the Valencia dinar) we calculate the simple average.  42
 
 







Share of years in which there was 
a debasement of the currency (i.e. 












 and year  All  15 percent or 
greater 
      
1371–1499 –69.7  –11.1    1463 25.8  0.0  Austria Vienna 
kreuzer 1500–1799  –59.7  –12.5  1694  11.7 0.0 
      
1349–1499 –83.8  –34.7  1498  7.3 3.3  Belgium 
hoet 1500–1799  –56.3  –15.0  1561  4.3 0.0 
      
1258–1499 –74.1  –56.8  1303  6.2 0.4  France livre 
tournois 1500–1789  –78.4  –36.2  1718  14.8 1.4 
G e r m a n y        
1417–1499 –32.2  –21.5  1424  3.7 1.2  Bavaria– 
Augsburg 
pfenning 
1500–1799 –70.9  –26.0  1685  3.7 1.0 
1350–1499 –14.4  –10.5  1404  2.0 0.0  Frankfurt 
pfenning 1500–1798  –12.8 –16.4  1500  2.0 0.3 
      
1280–1499 –72.4  –21.0  1320  5.0 0.0  Italy lira 
fiorentina 1500–1799  –35.6 –10.0  1550  2.7 0.0 
Netherlands       
1366–1499 –44.4  –26.0  1488  13.4 5.2  Flemish grote 
1500–1575 –12.3  –7.7  1526  5.3   0.0 
1450–1499 –42.0  –34.7  1496  14.3 6.1  Guilder  
1500–1799 –48.9  -15.0  1560  4.0 0.0 
      
 Portugal reis  1750–1799  -25.6  –3.7  1766  34.7 0.0 
      
Russia ruble  1761–1799  –42.3  –14.3  1798  44.7 0.0 
S p a i n        
New Castille 
maravedis 
1501–1799 –62.5  –25.3  1642  19.8 1.3 
1351–1499 –7.7  –2.9  1408  2.0 0.0  Valencia dinar 
1500–1650 –20.4  –17.0  1501  13.2 0.7 
      
Sweden mar 
ortug 
1523–1573 –91.0  –41.4  1572  20.0 12.0 
      Turkey 
Akche 1527–1799 –59.3  –43.9  1586  10.5 3.1 
      
1260–1499 –46.8  –20.0  1464  0.8 0.8  United 
Kingdom 
pence 
1500–1799 –35.5  –50.0  1551  2.3 1.3 
Sources:  Primarily Allen and Unger and other sources listed in Table AI.4.   
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All  15 percent or 
greater 
       
Austria 
 
1800–1860 –58.3  –55.0  1812  37.7 11.5 
       
Germany 1800–1830  –2.2  –2.2  1816  3.2 0.0 
       
Italy 1800–1859  0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0 
       
Portugal 1800–1855  –12.8 –18.4  1800  57.1 1.8 
       
Russia 1800–1899  –56.6  –41.3  1810  50.0 7.0 
       
Turkey 1800–1899  –83.1  –51.2  1829  7.0 7.0 
       
United 
Kingdom 
1800–1899 –6.1  –6.1  1816  1.0 0.0 
      
Sources:  Primarily Allen and Unger and other sources listed in Table AI.4.   
 
Inflation 
However spectacular some of the coinage debasements reported in Tables 9 and 10, 
there is no question that the advent of the printing press brought inflation up to a whole 
new level. Figure 12 illustrates the median inflation rate for all the countries in our sample, 
from 1500 to 2006 (taking a five-year moving average to smooth out cycle and 
measurement error).  The figure shows a clear inflationary bias throughout history 
(although of course there are always periods of deflation due to business cycles, poor crops, 
etc.). Starting in the twentieth century, however, inflation spikes radically.    
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Figure 13 
Median Inflation Rate All Countries




















Sources: There are innumerable sources given the length of the period covered and the large number of 
countries included.  These are listed in Table AI. 
 
We look at country inflation data across the centuries in the next three tables.  Table 
11 gives data for the sixteenth through nineteenth century over a broad range of currencies.  
What is stunning is that every country in both Asia and Europe experienced a significant 
number of years with inflation over 20 percent during this era, and most experienced a 
significant number of years with inflation over 40 percent.  Take Korea, for example, 
where our dataset begins in 1743.  Korea experienced inflation of over 20 percent almost 
half the time until 1800, and inflation over 40 percent almost one-third of the time.   
Poland, where the data go back to 1704, has extremely similar ratios.  Even the United 
States experienced an episode of very high inflation, as inflation peaked at nearly 200 
percent five percent in 1779.  The New World colonies of Latin America experienced 
frequent bouts of very high inflation long before the wars of independence from Spain.   45
































Japan 1601-1650  34.0 14.0  0  98.9 1602 
Korea 1743-1799  43.9  29.8  0  143.9 1787 
Europe          
Austria 1501-1799  8.4  6.0  0  99.1  1623 
Belgium 1501-1799 25.1  11.0  0  185.1  1708 
Denmark 1749-1799  18.8  10.4  0  77.4  1772 
France 1501-1799  12.4  2.0  0  121.3 1622 
Germany 1501-1799  10.4  3.4  0  140.6  1622 
Italy 1501-1799  19.1 7.0  0  173.1  1527 
Netherlands 1501-1799  4.0  0.3  0  40  1709 
Norway 1666-1799 6.0  0.8  0  44.2  1709 
Poland 1704-1799  43.8  31.9  0  92.1  1762 
Portugal 1729-1799 19.7  2.8  0  83.1  1757 
Spain 1501-1799  4.7  0.7  0  40.5 1521 
Sweden 1540-1799  15.5  4.1  0  65.8  1572 
Turkey 1586-1799  19.2  11.2  0  53.4  1621 
United 
Kingdom 
1501-1799 5.0  1.7  0  39.5  1587 
The “New 
World” 
        
Argentina 1777-1799  4.2  0.0  0  30.8  1780 
Brazil 1764-1799  25.0  4.0  0  33.0 1792 
Chile 1751-1799  4.1  0.0  0  36.6 1763 
Mexico 1742-1799  22.4  7.0  0  80.0  1770 
Peru 1751-1799  10.2 0.0  0  31.6  1765 
United 
States 
1721-1799 7.6  4.0  0  192.5  1779 
         
 
1 Hyperinflation is defined here as an annual inflation rate of 500 percent or higher (this is not the traditional 
Cagan definition). 
 
Table 12 looks at the same years 1800–2006 as Table 11, but for thirteen African 
countries and twelve Asian countries. South Africa, Hong Kong and Malaysia have notably 
the best track records at resisting high inflation, albeit South Africa’s record extends back   46
to 1896, whereas Malaysia’s and Hong Kong’s only go back to 1949 and 1948 
respectively.
14 
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Africa 
        
Algeria  1879 24.1 12.0  0  69.2 1947 




1957 4.0  0.0  0  27.7  1971 
Cote 
D’Ivoire 
1952 7.3  0.0  0  26.0  1994 
Egypt 1860  7.5 0.7  0  40.8  1941 
Kenya  1949 8.3  3.3  0  46.0  1993 
Mauritius 1947  10  0.0  0  33.0  1980 
Morocco 1940  14.9  4.5  0  57.5  1947 
Nigeria  1940 22.6  9.4  0  72.9 1995 
South 
Africa 
1896 0.9  0.0  0  35.2  1919 
Tunisia 1940 11.9 6.0  0  72.1  1943 
Zambia  1943 29.7 15.6  0  183.3  1993 
Zimbabwe  1920 23.3 14.0    1,216.0  2006 
Asia          
China 1800  19.3  14.0  3 1,579.3  1947 
Hong 
Kong 
1948 1.7  0.0  0  21.7  1949 
India  1801 7.3  1.5  0  53.8  1943 
Indonesia  1819 18.6  9.6  1  939.8  1966 
Japan 1819  12.2  4.8  1  568.0  1945 
Korea 1800  35.3  24.6  0  210.4  1951 
Malaysia 1949  1.7  0.0  0  22.0  1950 
Myanmar  1872 22.2  6.7  0  58.1 2002 
Philippines  1938 11.6  7.2  0  141.7  1943 
Singapore 1949  3.4  0.0  0  23.5  1973 
Taiwan 1898  14.7 11.0  0  29.6  1973 
Thailand 
 
1821 14.0  7.5  0  78.5   
 
                                                 
14 The dates in table 13 extend back prior to independence for many countries, including for example 
Malaysia.   47
Most of the countries in Asia and Africa however, have experienced waves of high 
and very high inflation.  The notion that Asian countries have been immune from Latin 
American–style high inflation is just as naïve as the notion that Asian countries were 
immune from default crises up until the late 1990s Asian financial crisis.   China 
experienced over 1500 percent inflation in 1947
15, Indonesia over 900 percent in 1966. 
Even the Asian tigers Singapore and Taiwan experienced inflation well over 20 percent in 
the early 1970s. 
Africa, perhaps not surprisingly, has a still worse record.  Angola had inflation of 
over 4,000 percent in 1996, and Zimbabwe of over 1,000 percent in 2006. Had we extended 
the table through 2007, we would have picked up Zimbabwe’s 66,000 percent inflation for 
2007, putting that country on track to surpass the Republic of the Congo (not included in 
our sample), which has experienced three hyperinflations since 1970 (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2002). 
Finally, Table 13 lists inflation for 1800 through 2006 for Europe, Latin America, 
North America and Oceana.  The European experiences include the great post-war 
hyperinflations studied by Cagan (1956).  But even setting aside the hyperinflations, we see 
that countries such as Poland, Russia and Turkey experienced high inflation an 
extraordinarily large percent of the time.  Norway had 152 percent inflation in 1812, 
Denmark 48 percent inflation in 1800, and Sweden 36 percent inflation in 1918.  Latin 
America’s post–World War II inflation history is famously spectacular, as the table 
illustrates, with many episodes of peacetime hyperinflations in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
                                                 
15 China, which invented the printing press well ahead of Europe, famously experienced paper-currency-
created high inflation episodes in the twelfth and thirteen centuries. (See for example, Fischer, Sahay and 
Vegh, 2003)  These episodes are in our database as well.   48
Table13. “Default” through Inflation: 
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Europe          
Austria 1800  20.8  12.1  2  1,733.0  1922 
Belgium 1800  10.1  6.8 0 50.6  1812 
Denmark 1800  2.1  0.5  0 48.3  1800 
Finland 1861  5.5  2.7  0  242.0  1918 
France 1800  5.8  1.9  0  74.0  1946 
Germany 1800  9.7  4.3  2  2.22E+10  1923 
Greece 1834  13.3  5.2  4  3.02E+10  1944 
Hungary 1924  15.7  3.6 2  9.63+26  1946 
Italy 1800  11.1  5.8  0  491.4  1944 
Netherlands 1800  1.0  0.0  0  21.0  1918 
Norway 1800  5.3  1.9  0  152.0  1812 
Poland 1800  28.0  17.4  2  51,699.4  1923 
Portugal 1800  9.7  4.3 0  84.2  1808 
Russia 1854  35.7  26.4  8  13,534.7  1923 
Spain 1800  3.9  1.0  0  102.1  1808 
Sweden 1800  1.9  0.0  0  35.8  1918 
Turkey 1800  20.5  11.7  0  115.9  1942 
United 
Kingdom 
1800 2.4  0.0  0  34.4 1800 
Latin America          
Argentina  1800 24.6  15.5  4  3,079.5  1989 
Bolivia 1937  38.6  20.0  2  11.749.6  1985 
Brazil 1800  28.0  17.9  6  2,947.7  1990 
Chile  1800 19.8  5.8  0  469.9 1973 
Colombia 1864  23.8  1.4  0  53.6  1882 
Costa Rica  1937 12.9  1.4  0  90.1 1982 
Dominican 
Republic 
1943 17.2  9.4  0  51.5 2004 
Ecuador  1939 36.8  14.7  0  96.1 2000 
El Salvador  1938  8.7  0.0  0  31.9  1986 
Guatemala 1938  8.7  1.4  0  41.0  1990 
Honduras 1937  8.6  0.0  0  34.0  1991 
Mexico 1800  42.5  35.7  0  131.8  1987 
Nicaragua 1938  30.4  17.4  6  13,109.5  1987 
Panama 1949  0.0  0.0  0  16.3  1974 
Paraguay 1949  32.8  4.5  0 139.1  1952 
Peru 1800  15.5  10.7  3  7,481.7  1990 
Uruguay 1871  26.5  19.1  0  112.5  1990 
Venezuela 1832  10.3  3.4  0  99.9  1996 
North America          
Canada 1868  0.7  0.0  0  23.8  1917 
United States  1800  1.0  0.0  0  24.0  1864 
Oceania           
Australia 1819  4.8  1.1 0 57.4  1854 
New Zealand  1858  0.0  0.0  0  17.2  1980   49
 In all of Table 13, only New Zealand and Panama have no periods of inflation over 
20 percent, although New Zealand’s inflation rate reached 17 percent as recently as 1980, 
and Panama had 16 percent inflation in 1974. 
  As with debt defaults, the last few years have been a relatively quiescent period in 
terms of very high inflation, although many countries (including Argentina, Venezuela and 
of course Zimbabwe) still have very high inflation.
16  Many observers, following the same 
logic as in commenting on external default, have concluded that “this time is different.”  
Perhaps, but, as with debt defaults, experience suggests that quiet periods do not extend 
indefinitely. 
Exchange rate crashes 
  Having discussed currency debasement and inflation crises, including at this late 
stage a long expose on exchange rate crashes seems somewhat redundant.   The database 
on exchange rates is almost as rich as that on prices, especially if one takes into account 
silver-based exchange rates, and is described in detail in the Appendices.  In this lengthy 
sample inflation crises and exchange rate crises travel hand- in- hand in the 
overwhelming majority of episodes across time and countries (with a markedly tighter 
link in chronic- inflation countries). 
  Instead, as regards exchange rate behavior, probably the most surprising evidence 
comes from the Napoleonic Wars, during which exchange rate instability escalated to a 
level that had not been seen before and was not to be seen again for nearly one hundred 
years.  This is starkly illustrated in Figures 14 and 15, with the former depicting the 
incidence of high inflation and the latter showing median inflation. The significantly higher 
                                                 
16 At the time of this writing the “official” inflation rate in Argentina is 8 percent—informed estimates place 
it at 26 percent.   50
incidence of crashes and larger median changes in the more modern period are hardly a 
surprise. 
Figure 14 
Currency Crashes: Share of Countries with an Annual 



















Median Annual Depreciation All Countries





















Sources:  The primary sources are Global Financial Data, and Reinhart and Rogoff (2003), but there are numerous 
others that are listed in Appendix I. 
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VII. Varieties of Crises 
  We deal with five “varieties” of economic crises:  external default, domestic 
default, banking crises, currency crashes, and inflation outbursts.
17  All these variables take 
on the value of one when there is a crisis and zero otherwise.  Thus, in a tranquil year the 
tally across crises for that particular country would total zero, while in the worst-case 
scenario (Argentina 2002, for instance) it would sum to five. Hence, each country has an 
entry each year in the 0 to 5 range.  We next take simple averages across all countries, or 
across countries in a particular region, and thus construct a composite index of financial 
instability that is multidimensional. 
These are the time series shown for the full sample in Figure 16 for the whole 
sample and for Asia.  We have comparable figures for all the other regions.  We selected 
Asia to highlight a point we have made earlier on more than one occasion.  Namely, that 
the 1997–1998 crisis was not the first and that the region had several protracted bouts of 
economic instability by international standards of the day. 
VIII. Conclusions 
This paper offers a detailed quantitative overview of the history of financial crises 
dating from the mid-fourteenth century default of Edward III of England to the present sub-
prime crisis in the United States.  Our study is based on a comprehensive new statistical 
dataset compiled by the authors that covers every region of the world and spans several 
centuries.  
Inevitably, a database of this scale and scope, involving so many primary and 
secondary historical sources (that do not always agree), will contain some errors and 
omissions, despite our best efforts.  We welcome suggestions for corrections, additions, 
                                                 
17 The total would come to 6 if we include currency debasement—but for this there is far less data across 
countries, as discussed.   52
and improvements of this database, which we will attempt to incorporate into the online 
version, with appropriate attribution and cross-referencing. 
Figure 16 
Variety of Crises, Asia: 1800-2006






































Sources: The authors’ calculations on the basis of the data reported in Appendices I and II and the crises 
definitions described earlier. 
Notes: We deal with five “varieties” of economic crises (external default, domestic default, banking crises, 
currency crashes, and inflation outbursts), and all these variables take on the value of one when there is a 
crisis and zero otherwise.  Thus, in a tranquil year the tally across crises for that particular country would total 
zero, while in the worst-case scenario (Argentina 2002, for instance) it would sum to five. Hence, each 
country has an entry each year in the 0–5 range.  We next take simple averages across all countries or across 
countries in a particular region and these are the time series shown above. 
  
Our principle aim here has been to illustrate some core features of this sweeping 
database, trying to bring out a few fundamental regularities.  We are fully aware that, in 
such a broad synthesis, we are inevitably obscuring important nuances surrounding 
historically diverse episodes.  
With these caveats in mind, this “panoramic” quantitative overview has revealed a 
number of important facts.  First and foremost, we illustrate the near universality of   53
episodes of serial default and high inflation in emerging markets, extending to Asia, Africa, 
and until not so long ago, Europe. We show that global debt crises have often radiated from 
the center through commodity prices, capital flows, interest rates, and shocks to investor 
confidence.  We also show that the popular notion that today’s emerging markets are 
breaking new ground in their extensive reliance on domestic debt markets, is hardly new. 
This brings us to our central theme—the “this time is different syndrome.”  There is 
a view today that both countries and creditors have learned from their mistakes.  Thanks to 
better-informed macroeconomic policies and more discriminating lending practices, it is 
argued, the world is not likely to again see a major wave of defaults.  Indeed, an often-cited 
reason these days why “this time it’s different” for the emerging markets is that 
governments there are relying more on domestic debt financing.  
Such celebration may be premature.  Capital flow/default cycles have been around 
since at least 1800—if not before.  Technology has changed, the height of humans has 
changed, and fashions have changed. Yet the ability of governments and investors to 
delude themselves, giving rise to periodic bouts of euphoria that usually end in tears, seems 
to have remained a constant.  As Kindelberger wisely titled the first chapter of his classic 
book “Financial Crisis: A Hardy Perennial.” 
On a more positive note, our paper at least raises the question of how a country 
might “graduate” from a history of serial default.  Although the case of seventeenth-century 
England has been much studied, it appears to be exceptional.  It is not clear how well the 
institutional innovations noted by North and Weingast (1996) would have fared had Britain 
been a bit less fortunate in the many wars it fought in subsequent years.  For example, had 
Napoleon not invaded Russia and France prevailed in the Napoleonic War, would Britain 
really have honored its debts.   54
Interesting recent cases include Greece and Spain, countries that appear to have 
escaped a severe history of serial default not only by reforming institutions, but by 
benefiting from the anchor of the European Union.  Austria, too, managed to emerge from 
an extraordinarily checkered bankruptcy history by closer integration with post-war 
Germany, a process that began even before European integration began to accelerate in the 
1980s and 1990s.  In Latin America, Chile has seemingly emerged from serial default 
despite extraordinary debt pressures through the simple expedient of running large and 
sustained current account surpluses.   These surpluses allowed the country to pay down its 
external debt to an extremely low level.  True graduation, of course, would mean that Chile 
could start raising its debt levels if needed (say, to benefit from countercyclical fiscal 
policy) without quickly slipping back into problems. 
Mexico is an interesting case where, despite profound failure to engage in deep 
institutional reform, the country stands on the verge of graduation thanks to a combination 
of better monetary and fiscal policy, as well as the North American Free Trade Agreement.  
It is an interesting question whether, through deeper economic integration, the United 
States can offer the same pull to Latin countries as the European Union has done in its early 
days.  Of course, if history tells us anything, it is that we cannot jump to “this time is 
different” conclusions.  In particular, concluding that countries like Hungary and Greece 
will never default again because “this time is different due to the European Union” may 
prove a very short-lived truism. 
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Appendix: A Global Database with a Long-term View: Sources and Methodology 
  
This appendix presents a broad-brush description of the comprehensive database used in 
this study and evaluates its main sources, strengths, and limitations.  Since the theme of this work is 
that the devil lurks in the details, further documentation on the coverage and numerous sources for 
individual time series by country and by period is provided in Data Appendices I and II. Those are 
devoted to the macroeconomic time series used and the public debt data (which is the centerpiece of 
our analysis), respectively.    
The remainder of this appendix is organized as follows:  The first section describes the 
compilation of the family of time series that are brought together from different major and usually 
well-known sources. These series include prices, modern exchange rates (and earlier metal-based 
ones), real GDP, and exports.  For the recent period, the data are primarily found in standard large-
scale databases.  For earlier history, we relied on individual scholars or groups of scholars—more 
details to follow.  Next, we describe the data that is more heterogeneous in both its sources and 
methodologies.  These are series on government finances, and individual efforts to construct 
national accounts—notably nominal and real GDP, particularly pre-1900.  The remaining two 
sections are devoted to describing the particulars of building a cross-country, multi-century 
database on public debt and its characteristics and the various manifestations and measurements of 
economic crises.  Those include domestic and external debt defaults, inflation and banking crises, 
and currency crashes and debasements.  The construction of the public domestic and external debt 
database can be best described as more akin to archeology than economics.  The compilation of   68
crises episodes encompasses both mechanical rules of thumb to date a crisis as well as arbitrary 
judgment calls on the interpretation of historical events as described by the financial press and 
scholars over the centuries. 
I.  Prices, Exchange Rates, Currency Debasement, and Real GDP 
1. Prices 
Since an overarching theme of our analysis is to document the incidence and magnitude of 
various forms of expropriation or default through the ages, no such study would be complete 
without taking stock of expropriation through inflation.  Following the rise of fiat currency, 
inflation became the modern-day version of currency debasement.  To that end, our preferred 
measures are consumer price indices or their close relative, cost-of-living indices (as those 
constructed by Williamson et al. in several “regional” papers).
18   Our data sources for the modern 
period are primarily the standard databases of the International Monetary Fund—International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Economic Outlook (WEO).  For pre–World War II coverage 
(usually from the early 1900s or late 1800s), Global Financial Data (GFD) and Williamson et al., 
and the Oxford Latin American History Database (OXLAD, http://oxlad.qeh.ox.ac.uk/) are key 
sources.   
Since our analysis spans several earlier centuries, we rely on the meticulous work of a number 
of economic historians who have constructed such price indices item by item, most often by city 
rather than by country, from primary sources.  In this regard, the scholars participating in the Global 
Price and Income History Group project at the University of California, Davis 
(http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/) and their counterparts at the Dutch International Institute of Social 
History (http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/ ) have been an invaluable source for prices is Europe and Asia. 
19  
The complete references by author to this body of scholarly work are given in Appendix I and in 
the references.  For colonial America, the Historical Statistics of the United States (HSUS , 
                                                 
18 These regional papers provided time series for numerous developing countries for the mid-1800s to pre–
WWII. 
19 While our analysis of inflation crises begins in 1500, many of the price series begin much earlier.     69
http://hsus.cambridge.org) recently updated the U.S. data, while Richard Gardner (Economic 
History Data Desk: Economic History of Latin America, the United States and the New World, 
1500–1900, at http://home.comcast.net/~richardgarner04/) covers key cities in Latin America. 
On methodology 
 When more than one index is available for a country, we work with the simple average. This is 
most useful when there are price series for more than one city for the same country, such as in the 
pre-1800s data.  When no such consumer price indices are available, we turn to wholesale or 
producer prices indices (as, for example, China in the 1800s and the U.S. in the 1720s).  Absent any 
composite index, we fill in the holes in coverage with individual commodity prices. This almost 
always takes the form of wheat prices for Europe and rice prices for Asia.  We realize that a single 
commodity (even if it is the most important one) is a relative price, rather than the aggregate we 
seek, so if on any given year we have at least one consumer (or cost-of-living) price series and the 
price of wheat (or rice)—we do not average the two but give full weight to the composite price 
index. Finally, from 1980 to the present the WEO data dominates all other sources, as it enforces 
uniformity—although for the recent period discrepancies across these price indices is, at most, 
trivial. 
2. Exchange rates, modern and early, and currency debasement 
  The handmaiden to inflation is, of course, currency depreciation.  For post–World War II 
data, our primary sources for exchange rates are IFS for official rates and Pick’s Currency 
Yearbooks for market-based rates, as quantified and documented in detail in Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004).  For modern pre-war rates GFD, OXLAD, HSUS, and the League of Nations Annual 
Reports are the primary sources.  These are sometimes supplemented with scholarly sources for 
individual countries, as described in Appendix I. Less modern are the exchange rates for the 
late1600s–early1800s for a handful of European currencies, which are taken from  John Castaing's 
Course of Exchange, which appeared twice a week (on Tuesdays and Fridays) from 1698   70
throughout the following century or so (see European State Finance Data Base, ESFDB, 
http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/frameset.html.) 
  The earlier “silver-based” exchange rates were calculated by these authors (trivially) from 
the time series provided primarily by Robert Allen (for other sources see Appendix  I, Table AI.4, 
which lists individual authors), who constructed continuous annual series on the silver content of 
several European currencies).
20 The earliest series begin in the mid-13
th century for Italy and 
England.  As we describe in this appendix, these series are the foundation for dating and 
quantifying the “debasement crises”—the precursors of modern devaluations. 
3. Real GDP 
  To maintain homogeneity, inasmuch as possible for our large sample of countries over the 
course of approximately 200 years, we employ as a primary source Angus Maddison’s data, 
spanning 1820–2003 (depending on the country), and its updated version through 2006 by the Total 
Economy Database (TED http://www.ggdc.net/).  GDP is calculated on the basis of PPP 1990 
International Geary–Khamis dollars.  TED contains, among other things, series on levels of real 
GDP, population, and GDP per capita, for up to 125 countries from 1950 to the present. These 
countries represent about 96 percent of the world population.  As the smaller and poorer countries 
are not in the database, the sample represents an even larger share of world GDP (99 percent). We 
do not attempt to include in our study aggregate measures of real economic activity prior to 1800.
21   
  To calculate a country’s share of world GDP continuously over the years, we sometimes 
found it necessary to interpolate the Maddison data.  For most countries, GDP is reported only for 
selected benchmark years (1820, 1850, 1870, etc.). Interpolation took three forms, ranging from the 
best or preferred practice to the most rudimentary.  When we had actual data for real GDP (from 
either official sources or other scholars) for periods for which the Maddison data is missing and 
periods for which both series are available, we ran auxiliary regressions of the Maddison GDP 
                                                 
20  Sevket Pamuk constructs comparable series for Turkey through World War I. 
21 There are exceptions.  For instance, Rodney Edvinsson’s careful estimates for Sweden 1720–2000 or 
HSUS for the US beginning in 1790 offer a basis on which to examine earlier economic cycles and 
their relation to crises.   71
series on the available GDP series for that particular country.  This allowed us to fill in the gaps for 
the Maddison data, thus maintaining cross-country comparability and enabling us to aggregate GDP 
by region or worldwide.  When no other measures of GDP were available to fill in the gaps, the 
auxiliary regressions linked the Maddison measure of GDP to other indicators of economic activity, 
such as an output index or, most often, central government revenues—for which we have long 
continuous time series. 
22  As a last resort, if no potential regressors were available, interpolation 
simply connected the dots of the missing Maddison data assuming a constant annual growth rate in 
between the reported benchmark years.  While this method of interpolation is, of course, useless 
from the vantage point of discerning any cyclical pattern, it still provides a reasonable measure of a 
particular country’s share of world GDP, as this share usually does not change drastically from year 
to year. 
4. Exports  
Though subject to chronic misinvoicing problems,
23 the external accounts are most often 
available for longer periods.  Misinvoicing not withstanding, those accounts can be considered 
more reliable than many other series of economic activity.  The series used in this study are taken 
from the IMF, while the earlier data come primarily from GFD and OXLAD.  Official historical 
statistics and assorted academic studies listed in Data Appendix I complement the main databases.  
Trade balances provide a rough measure of the country-specific capital flow cycle—particularly for 
the earlier periods when data on capital account balances are nonexistent.  Exports are also used to 
scale debt—particularly external debt. 
II. Government Finances and National Accounts 
1. Public finances 
  Government finances are primarily taken from Mitchell for the pre-1963 period and from 
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004) and sources cited therein for the more recent period.  The 
                                                 
22 It is well known that revenues are intimately linked to the economic cycle. 
23 See, for example, calculations in the background material to Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), 
http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/faculty/reinhart/PartII_Dual.pdf. 
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web pages of the central banks and finance ministries of the many countries in our sample provide 
the most up-to-date data. For many of the countries in our sample, particularly in Asia and Africa, 
the time series on central government revenues and expenditures date back to the colonial period. 
Details on individual country coverage are presented in Appendix Table AI.7.   In nearly all cases, 
the Mitchell data goes back to the 1800s, enabling us to calculate debt-to-revenue ratios for many of 
the earlier crises. 
Richard Bonney’s European State Finance Data Base (ESFDB), which brings together the 
data provided by many authors is an excellent source for the larger European countries for the pre-
1800 era, as it offers considerable detail on government revenues and expenditures, not to mention 
extensive bibliographical references.  
2. National Accounts 
Besides the standard sources, such as the IMF, United Nations, and World Bank, which 
provide data on national accounts for the post–World War II period (with different starting points 
depending on the country), we consult other multicountry databases such as OXLAD for earlier 
periods.  As with other time series used in this study, the constructed national account series 
(usually for pre–World War I) from many scholars around the world, such as Brahmananda for 
India, Baptista for Venezuela, and Yousef for Egypt, are incorporated into our collection. 
 
III. Public Debt and its Composition 
One would think that with at least 250 sovereign external default episodes during 1800–
2007 and at least 70 cases of default on domestic public debt (not to mention the significant 
economic disruption associated with these events), it would be relatively straightforward to find a 
comprehensive long time series on public sector debt.
24 Yet, this is not the case—far from it.  
Government debt is among the most elusive of economic time series.  
                                                 
24 These numbers are a lower bound, since they do not include the many sovereign defaults prior to 1800 and, 
as regards domestic defaults, we have only begun to skim the surface, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).   73
 For the advanced economies, the most comprehensive data comes from the OECD, which 
provides time series on general government debt since 1980.  However, this data has several 
important limitations: it only includes a handful of emerging markets; for many advanced 
economies (France, Finland, Greece, and the U.K., to name a few), the data actually begins much 
later in the 1990s, which cannot be considered as much of a time series; and only total debt is 
reported, with no particulars provided of the composition of debt (domestic versus foreign) or its 
maturity (long-term versus short-term).  To state that the IMF’s well-known World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) database extends to public debt requires a stretch of the imagination.
25  Data is only 
provided for the G-7 from 1980 onward (out of 180 countries covered in the WEO).   
The most comprehensive data on public debt comes from the World Bank’s Global 
Development Finance (GFD, known previously as the World Debt Tables).  It is an improvement 
on the other databases in that it begins (for most countries) in 1970 and it provides extensive detail 
on the particulars of external debt.  Yet, GFD also has serious limitations.  There are no advanced 
economies included in the database (nor newly-industrialized countries (such as Israel, Korea, or 
Singapore, for that matter) to facilitate comparisons.  Unlike data from the IMF and the World 
Bank for exchange rates, prices, government finances, etc., there is no data prior to 1970.  Last, but 
certainly not least, these data only cover external debt.  In a few countries, such as Panama or Côte 
D’Ivoire, external debt is a sufficient statistic on government liabilities, since domestic public debt 
levels are relatively trivial.  As Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) illustrate, however, for most countries 
domestic debt accounts for an important share of total government debt.  The all-country average 
oscillates between 40 to 80 percent during 1900–2006.
26 
In search of the elusive data on total public debt, we examined the archives of the global 
institutions’ predecessor, the League of Nations, and found that this institution collected 
information on, among other things, public domestic and external debt in its Statistical Yearbook  
                                                 
25 This description comes from the IMF’s web site: “Download time series data for GDP growth, inflation, 
unemployment, payments balances, exports, imports, external debt, capital flows, commodity prices, more.” 
26  For some countries, such as the Netherlands, Singapore, and the United States, practically all public debt is 
domestic.   74
(1926–1944).  While, neither the IMF nor the World Bank continued this practice after the war, the 
newly-formed United Nations (UN) inherited the data collected by the League of Nations and in 
1948 its Department of Economic Affairs, published a special volume on public debt, spanning 
1914–1946.  From that time onwards the UN continued to collect and publish the domestic and 
external debt data in the same format as their pre-war predecessor on an annual basis in their 
Statistical Yearbooks.  As former colonies became independent nations, the database expanded 
accordingly.  This practice continued until 1983, at which time the domestic and external public 
debt series were discontinued altogether.  In total, these sources yield time series that span 1914– 
1983 for the most complete cases.  It covers advanced and developing economies.  For the most 
part, it also disaggregated domestic debt into its long-term and short-term components. To the best 
of our knowledge, this data is not available electronically in any database, hence it required going 
to the original publications.  This data provides the starting point for our public debt series, which 
have been (where possible) extended to the period prior to 1914 and post-1983.  
For data prior to 1914 (including several countries that were then colonies)
27, we consulted 
numerous sources, both country-specific statistical and government agencies and individual 
scholars. Data Appendix II provides details or the sources by country and time period.  When no 
public debt data is available prior to 1914, we proceed to approximate the foreign debt stock by 
reconstructing debt from individual international debt issues.  This debenture data also provide a 
proximate measure of gross international capital inflows.  Much of the data come from scholars 
including Lindert and Morton, Marichal, Miller, and Wynne, among others. From these data, we 
construct a foreign debt series (but, not total debt).
28 This exercise allows us to examine standard 
debt ratios for default episodes for several newly-independent nations in Latin America as well as 
Greece and important defaults such as that of China in 1921, and Egypt and Turkey in the 1860s–
1870s.   These data are most useful for filling holes in the external debt time series, when countries 
                                                 
27 For Australia, Ghana, India, Korea, South Africa, among others, we have put together debt data for much of 
the colonial period. 
28 Flandreau and Zumer (2004) are an important data source for Europe, 1880–1913.   75
first tap international capital markets.  Their usefulness (as measures of debt) is acutely affected by 
repeated defaults, write-offs, and debt restructurings that introduce disconnects between the 
amounts of debt issued and the subsequent debt stock.
29   
For some countries (or colonies in the earlier period) where we have only relatively recent 
data for total public debt, but have reliable data going much further back on central government 
revenues and expenditures, we calculate and cumulate fiscal deficits to provide a rough 
approximation to the debt stock.
30 
To update the data for post-1983, we mostly rely on GFD for external debt. Two very 
valuable recent studies facilitate the update:  Jeanne and Guscina (2006) compile detailed date on 
the composition of domestic and external debt for 19 important emerging markets for 1980–2005; 
Cowan, Levy-Yeyati, Panizza, Sturzenegger (2006) perform a similar exercise for all the 
developing countries of the Western hemisphere for 1980–2004.  Last, but certainly not least, are 
the official government sources themselves, which are increasingly forthcoming in providing 
domestic debt data, often under the IMF’s 1996 initiative, Special Data Dissemination Standard.  
IV. Global variables 
  Global variables (for lack of a better name, since this term is of fairly recent vintage) have 
two components:  those indicators that are, indeed, global in scope—namely, world commodity 
prices, and country-specific key economic and financial indicators for the world’s financial centers 
during 1800–2007.  For commodity prices, we have time series since the late 1700s from four 
different sources (see Data Appendix I).  The key economic indicators include the current account 
deficit, real and nominal GDP, and short- and long-term interest rates for the relevant financial 
center of the time (i.e., the U.K. prior to World War I and the U.S, subsequently). 
V. Varieties of Economic Crises and their Dates 
                                                 
29  Even under these circumstances, they continue to be a useful measure of gross capital inflows, as there was 
relatively little private external borrowing nor bank lending in the earlier sample. 
30 Indonesia prior to 1972 is a good example where this exercise was particularly useful.   76
To identify crisis episodes, we used two approaches, one is quantitative in nature while the 
other is based on a chronology of events.  This approach is similar to that followed in Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999), who used quantitative thresholds to date currency crises and events to date 
banking crises. Details follow. 




Since we want to study the incidence of expropriation in its various forms, we are not only 
interested in dating the beginning of an inflation or currency crisis episode but its duration as well.  
Many of the high-inflation spells can be best described as chronic—lasting many years.  In our 
earlier work (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004), which classified exchange rate arrangements for the 
post–World War II period, we used a 12-month inflation threshold of 40 or higher percent to define 
a “freely falling” episode.  In this study, which spans a much longer period before the widespread 
creation of fiat currency, inflation rates well below 40 percent per annum were considered as 
inflation crises.  Thus, we adopt an inflation threshold of 20 percent per annum.  Median inflation 
rates before World War I were well below those of the more recent period:  0.5 for 1500–1799; 
0.71 for 1800–1913; and 5.0 for 1914–2006.  Furthermore, as the last column of Table A1 
highlights, hyperinflations are of modern vintage, with Hungary 1946 holding the record in our 
sample. 
Currency crashes 
To date currency crashes, we follow a variant of Frankel and Rose (1996), who focus 
exclusively on the exchange rate depreciation. This definition is the most parsimonious, as it does 
not rely on other variables such as reserve losses and interest rate hikes.  Mirroring our treatment of 
inflation episodes, we are not only concerned here with the dating of the initial crash (as in Frankel 
and Rose, 1996 and Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) but with the full period in which annual 
depreciations exceed the threshold.  Hardly surprising, the largest crashes shown in Table A1 are   77
similar in timing and orders of magnitudes as the inflation profile.  The “honor” of the record 
currency crash, however, goes to Greece in 1944.   78
Currency debasement 
The predecessor of modern inflation and foreign exchange rate crises was currency 
debasement during the long era when the principal means of exchange were metallic coins.  
Debasements were particularly frequent and large during wars.  Indeed, drastic reductions in the 
silver content of the currency provided many sovereigns with their most important source of 
financing.  Figure A1, which depicts the track record for Russia and Austria during the Napolenic 
Wars, is indeed representative of many more episodes. 
Finally, we also date currency “reforms” or conversions and their magnitudes.  Such 
conversions form a part of every hyperinflation episode in our sample, in effect, it is not unusual to 
have several conversions in quick succession.  For example, in its struggle with hyperinflation, 
Brazil had no less than four conversions from 1986 to1994.  However, when it comes to the 
magnitude of a single conversion, the record holder is China in 1948, with a conversion rate of 
three-million to one.  Conversions also follow spells of high (but not necessarily hyper inflation), 
and these cases are also included in our list of modern debasements.  
 
Table A1.   Defining Crises:  A Summary of Quantitative Thresholds 
Crisis type  Threshold  Period  Maximum 
Inflation  An annual inflation rate 20 percent or higher. We 
also examine separately the incidence of more 











An annual depreciation versus the US dollar (or the 
relevant anchor currency—historically the UK 
pound, the French franc, or the German DM and 










A reduction in the metallic content of coins in 








A currency reform where a new currency replaces a 
much-depreciated earlier currency in circulation. 
The most extreme episode in our 
sample is the 1948 Chinese 
conversion at a rate of 3 million to 1. 
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Figure A1. Changes in the Silver Content of the Currency: Austria and 
























The same quantitative methodology could be applied to date the burst of asset price bubbles 
(equity or real estate) that are so commonplace in the run-up to banking crises, but we do not 
encompass such episodes in this study and leave it for future research.
31 
2. Crises defined by events: banking crises and domestic and external debt defaults 
In this section, we describe the criteria used in this study to date banking crises, external 
debt crises, and their little known or understood domestic debt crises counterparts. 
 Banking Crises 
With regard to banking crises, our analysis stresses events.  The main reason for following 
this approach has to do with the lack of long time series data that allows us to date banking or 
                                                 
31 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for the construction of thresholds to date equity price crashes and 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) for a depiction of the behavior of real estate prices on the eve of banking crises in 
industrialized economies.   80
financial crises quantitatively along the lines of inflation or currency crashes.  For example, the 
relative price of bank stocks (or financial institutions relative to the market) would be a logical 
indicator to examine.  However, this is problematic, particularly for the earlier part of our sample as 
well as for developing countries (where many domestic banks do not have publicly traded equity). 
 If the beginning of a banking crisis is marked by bank runs and withdrawals, then changes 
in bank deposits could be used to date the crises.  This indicator would have certainly done well in 
dating the numerous banking panics of the 1800s.  Often, however, the banking problems do not 
arise from the liability side, but from a protracted deterioration in asset quality, be it from a collapse 
in real estate prices or increased bankruptcies in the nonfinancial sector.  In this case, a large 
increase in bankruptcies or nonperforming loans could be used to mark the onset of the crisis.  
Indicators of business failures and nonperforming loans are also usually available sporadically, if at 
all; the latter are also made less informative by banks’ desire to hide their problems for as long as 
possible. 
Given these data limitations, we mark a banking crisis by two types of events: (1) bank runs 
that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial 
institutions (as in Venezuela in 1993 or Argentina in 2001); and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, 
merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or 
group of institutions), that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial 
institutions (as in Thailand 1996–97).  We rely on existing studies of banking crises and on the 
financial press; according to these studies the fragility of the banking sector was widespread during 
these periods.  
Many country-specific studies (such as Camprubi, 1957, for Peru; Cheng, 2003, and 
McElderry, 1976, for China; and Noel, 2002, for Mexico) pick up banking crisis episodes not 
covered by the multicountry literature and contribute importantly to this chronology, but the main 
sources for cross-country dating of crises are as follows:  For post-1970, the comprehensive and 
well-known study by Caprio and Klingebiel—which the authors updated through 2003—is   81
authoritative, especially when it comes to classifying banking crises into systemic or more benign 
categories; Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and Jacome (2008) for Latin America round out the 
sources.  For pre–World War II, Kindleberger (1989), Bordo et al. (2001), and Willis (1926) 
provide multicountry coverage on banking crises.   
We relegate a summary discussion of the limitations of this event-based dating approach to 
Table A2, while the years in which the banking crises began are listed in Table A3—unfortunately, 




Table A2. Defining Crises by Events:  A Summary 
 
Type of Crisis 
 












We mark a banking crisis by two types 
of events: (1) bank runs that lead to the 
closure, merging, or takeover by the 
public sector of one or more financial 
institutions; and (2) if there are no runs, 
the closure, merging, takeover, or 
large-scale government assistance of an 
important financial institution (or group 
of institutions), that marks the start of a 
string of similar outcomes for other 
financial institutions.   
This approach to dating the beginning of a 
banking crisis is not without drawbacks.  It 
could date a crisis too late, because the 
financial problems usually begin well before 
a bank is finally closed or merged; it could 
also date a crisis too early, because the worst 
part of a crisis may come later.  Unlike the 
external debt crises (see below), which have 
well-defined closure dates, it is often difficult 
or impossible to accurately pinpoint the year 
in which a crisis ended. 
Debt crises: 
External 
A sovereign default is defined as the 
failure to meet a principal or interest 
payment on the due date (or within the 
specified grace period).  The episodes 
also include instances where 
rescheduled debt is ultimately 
extinguished in terms less favorable 
than the original obligation. 
While the time of default is accurately 
classified as a crisis year there are a large 
number of cases where the final resolution 
with the creditors (if it ever did take place) 
seems interminable.  Fort his reason we also 
work with a crisis dummy that only picks up 
the first year. 
Debt crisis: 
Domestic 
The definition given above for external 
debt applies. In addition, domestic debt 
crises have involved the freezing of 
bank deposits and or forcible 
conversions of such deposits from 
dollars to local currency. 
There is at best some partial documentation 
of recent defaults on domestic debt provided 
by Standard and Poors. Historically, it is very 
difficult to date these episodes and in many 
cases  (like banking crises) it is impossible to 
ascertain the date of the final resolution. 
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External Debt Crises 
  External debt crises involve outright default on payment of external debt obligations 
(Argentina 2001 holds the record for the largest default), repudiation (as in Mexico 1867, when an 
over 100 million pesos of debt, issued by Maximillian, was repudiated by the Juarez government), 
or the restructuring of debt into terms less favorable to the lender than those in the original contract 
(for instance, India’s little-known external restructurings in 1958–1972. 
  These events have received considerable attention in the academic literature from leading 
modern-day economic historians, such as Michael Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, Marc Flandreau, 
Lindert and Morton, and Alan Taylor.
32 Relative to early banking crises (not to mention domestic 
debt crises—which have been all but ignored in the literature) much is known about the causes and 
consequences of these rather dramatic episodes.  The dates of sovereign defaults and restructurings 
are those listed in Tables 2–5. For post-1824, the dates come from several Standard and Poors 
studies.  However, these are incomplete, missing numerous post-war restructurings and early 
defaults so this source has been supplemented with additional information from Lindert and Morton 
(1989), MacDonald (2003), Purcell and Kaufman (1993), Suter (1992), and Tomz (2007).  Of 
course, required reading in this field includes Winkler (1933) and Wynne (1951). 
Methodology 
While the time of default is accurately classified as a crisis year there are a large number of 
cases where the final resolution with the creditors (if it ever did take place) seems interminable.  
Russia’s default following the revolution holds the record, lasting 69 years.  Greece’s default in 
1826 shut it out from international capital markets for 53 consecutive years, while Honduras’s 1873 
default had a comparable duration.
33   Looking at the full default episode is, of course, useful for 
characterizing the borrowing/default cycles, calculating hazard rates, etc.  But it is hardly credible 
that a spell of 53 years could be considered a crisis—even if they weren’t exactly prosperous years.  
Thus, in addition to constructing the country-specific dummy variables to cover the entire episode, 
                                                 
32 This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of the scholars that have worked on historical sovereign defaults. 
33 At present, Honduras remains in default since 1981, 27 years.   83
we also employ two other qualitative variables.  The first of these only enters as a crisis the year of 
default; while the second creates a seven-year window centered on the default date.  The rationale is 
that neither the three years that precede a default nor the three years that follow it can be considered 
a “normal” or “tranquil” period.  As in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), this allows us to analyze the 
behavior of various economic and financial indicators surrounding the crisis. 
Domestic Debt Crises 
  Information on domestic debt crises is scarce but it is not because these crises do not take 
place.  Indeed, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) show, domestic debt crises typically take place 
against much worse economic conditions than the average external default.  Usually domestic debt 
crises do not involve external creditors, perhaps this may help explain why so many episodes go 
unnoticed.  Of course, this is not always the case, Mexico’s much-publicized near-default in 1994–
1995 would have been a “famous” domestic default crisis indeed, since the dollar-linked 
government debt, the Tesebonos, that were on the verge of default, were issued under domestic law 
and were part of domestic debt.  One can only speculate that if the Tesobonos had not been so 
widely held by nonresidents, perhaps this crisis would have received less attention.  Since 1980, 
Argentina has defaulted three times on its domestic debt—the two defaults that coincided with 
defaults in external debt (1982 and 2001) did attract considerable international attention.  The large-
scale 1989 default that did not involve a new default on external debt and did not involve 
nonresidents is scarcely known in the literature.  Even the many defaults on domestic debt during 
the Great Depression in advanced economies and developing ones are not well documented. 
Another feature that characterizes domestic defaults is that references to arrears or 
suspension of payments on domestic debt are often relegated to footnotes.  Lastly, some of the 
domestic defaults that involved the forcible conversion of foreign currency deposits into local 
currency have occurred during banking crises, hyperinflations, or a combination of the two 
(Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina are in this list).     84
The approach toward constructing categorical variables follows that previously described 
for external debt default.  Like banking crises and unlike external debt defaults, for many episodes 
of domestic default the endpoint for the crisis is not well known.   85
 
Table A3. Banking Crises Dates and Capital Mobility: 1800-2007 
High-Income  Middle Income  Low Income 
Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear 
 
Capital Mobility: Low-Moderate, 1800-1879 
France 1802         
France 1805         
UK 1810         
UK 1815         
Denmark 1813         
US 1818         
UK, US  1825         
US 1836         
Canada, UK  1837         
UK 1847         
Belgium 1848         
UK, US  1857      India  1863 
Italy, UK  1866         
Austria,  US  1873 Peru  1873    
   South  Africa  1877    
 
Capital Mobility: High, 1880-1914 
Germany 1880         
France    1882 Mexico  1883    
US 1884         
Denmark 1885         
Italy 1887         






1890    
Germany, 
Italy, Portugal 
1891        
Australia 1893         
Netherlands, 
Sweden 
1897        
Norway  1898 Chile  1899    
Finland  1900 Brazil  1900    
Germany, 
Japan 





1907 Mexico  1907    
  Chile 1908    









1914    
Capital Mobility: Low, 1915-1919 
  Chile 1915      86
Table A3. Banking Crises Dates and Capital Mobility: 1800–2007 (continued) 
High Income  Middle Income  Low Income 
Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear 
 
Capital Mobility: Moderate, 1920–1929 




1921     India  1921 
Canada, Japan, 
Taiwan 
1923 China  1923    
Austria  1924       
Belgium, 
Germany 
1925 Brazil,  Chile  1926    
Japan,  Taiwan  1927       
US  1929 Brazil,  Mexico  1929 India  1929 
 
Capital Mobility: Low, 1930–1969 









1931    
Belgium 1934  Argentina, 
China 
1934    
Italy  1935 Brazil  1937    
Belgium, 
Finland 
1939        
      India 1947 
  Brazil  1963     
 
Capital Mobility: Moderate, 1970–1979 
  Uruguay  1971     





1977 South  Africa  1977    
  Venezuela  1978      87
 
 
Table A3. Banking Crises Dates and Capital Mobility: 1800-2007 (continued) 
High-Income  Middle Income  Low Income 
Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear 
Capital Mobility: High, 1980-2007 




1980    
   Mexico,  
Philippines 
Uruguay 
1981    
Hong Kong, 
Singapore 
1982  Colombia, 
Turkey 






1983  Morocco, 
Peru, 
Thailand 
1983  Equatorial 
Guinea, Niger 
1983 
UK, US  1984      Mauritania  1984 
   Argentina, 
Brazil, 
Malaysia 
1985  Guinea, 
Kenya 
1985 













   Lebanon, 
Panama 














1989    
Italy 1990  Algeria, 
Brazil, Egypt, 
Romania 


























  Cape Verde, 
Venezuela 
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Table A3. Banking Crises Dates and Capital Mobility: 1800–2007 (continued) 
High Income  Middle Income  Low Income 
Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear 
 
Capital Mobility: High, 1980–2007 











































1998    
   Bolivia, 
Honduras, Peru 
1999    
   Nicaragua  2000    
   Argentina, 
Guatemala 
2001    
   Paraguay 
Uruguay 
2002    
   Dominican 
Republic 
2003    
   Guatemala  2006    
US  2007         89
Data Appendix I.  Macro Time Series 
 
This data appendix covers the macro time series used, while a separate appendix is devoted 
to the database on government debt. 
 
Abbreviations of Frequently-used Sources (Additional sources listed in tables below) 
 
DIA: Diaz (et. al) 
ESFDB:  European State Finance Data Base 
GFD: Global Financial Data 
GPIHG: Global Price and Income History Group 
IISH: International Institute of Social History 
IFS:  International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
KRV: Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh 
MAD: Maddison 
MIT: Mitchell 
OXF: Oxford Latin American History Database 
RR: Reinhart and Rogoff 
TED:  Total Economy Database 
WEO: World Economic Outlook, IMF 
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Table AI. 1 Prices: Consumer or cost-of-living indices 
(unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Sources  Commentary 
Algeria  1869-1884  Hoffman et. al.  Wheat prices 
  1938-2007 GFD/WEO   
Angola  1914-1962 MIT   
  1991-2007 WEO   
Argentina  1775-1812  Gardner  Buenos Aires only 
 1864-1940  Williamson  et.  al.   
  1884-1913  Flandreau & Zumer   
 1900-2000  OXF   
  1913-2000  Diaz et. al.   
 1913-2007  GFD/WEO   
Australia  1818-1850 Butlin,  Vanplew, 
GPIHG 
New Wales, food prices 
  1850-1983 Shergold,  GPIHG  Sidney,  food 
  1861-2007 GFD/WEO   
Austria  1440-1800 Allen  Vienna 
  1800-1914  Hoffman et. al.  Wheat prices 
  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer    
  1919-2007 GFD/WEO   
Belgium  1462-1913 Allen  Antwerp 
  1835-2007 GFD/WEO   
Bolivia  1936-2007 GFD/WEO   
Brazil  1763-1820  Garner  Rio de Janeiro only 
  1830-1937  Williamson et. al.  Rio de Janeiro only 
  1861-2000  Diaz et. al.   
 1912-2007  GFD/WEO     
Canada  1867-1975 CanStat   
  1910-2007 GFD/WEO   
Central African 
Republic 
1956-1993 MIT   
  1980-2007 WEO   
Chile  1754-1806 Garner  Santiago  only 
  1810-2000  Diaz e. al.   
  1900-2000 OXF   
  1913-2007 GFD/WEO   
China  1500-1910 Peng  Rice  prices 
 1638-1936  Wang  Rice  prices 
 1867-1935  Hsu  Wholesale  prices 
  1926-1948,  
1978-2007 
GFD/WEO  
Colombia  1863-1940 Williamson  et.  al.   
  1900-2000 OXF   
  1923-2007 GFD/WEO   
Costa Rica  1937-2007 GFD/WEO   
Cote D’Ivoire  1951-2007 GFD/WEO   
Denmark  1748-1800  Hoffman et. al.  Wheat prices 
  1815-2007 GFD/WEO   
Dominican Republic  1942-2000 OXF   
  1980-2007 WEO   
Ecuador  1939-2007 GFD/WEO   
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Table AI.1 Prices: Consumer or cost-of-living indices-continued 
 (unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Sources  Commentary 
Egypt  1859-1941 WILL   
  1913-2007 GFD/WEO   
  1915-1999 GFD   
El Salvador  1937-2000 OXD   
  1980-2007 WEO   
Finland  1860-2001 Finnish  Historical 
National Accounts 
 
  1980-2007 WEO   
France  1431-1786 
1840-1913 
Allen  
  1807-1935 Dick  Retail  prices 
  1840-2007 GFD/WEO   
Germany  1427-1765 Allen  Munich 
  1637-1855  Hoffman et. al.  Wheat prices 
  1820-2007 GFD/WEO   
Greece  1833-1938  Kostelenos et. al.  GDP deflator 
  1922-2007 GFD/WEO   
Ghana  1949-2007 GFD/WEO   
Guatemala  1938-2000 OXD   
  1980-2007 WEO   
Honduras  1938-2000 OXD   
  1980-2007 WEO   
Hungary  1923-2007 GFD/WEO   
India  1866-2000  Diaz et. al.   
  1873-1939 Williamson  et.  al.   
  1913-2007 GFD/WEO   
Indonesia  1820-1940 Williamson  et.  al.   
  1948-2007 GFD/WEO   
Italy  1548-1645 
1734-1806 
Allen Naples 
  1701-1860  DeMaddalena  Wheat prices, Milan 
  1861-2007 GFD/WEO   
Korea  1690-1909  Jun & Lewis  Rice prices in the 
southern region of 
Korea 
  1906-1939 Williamson  et.  al.   
  1948-2007 GFD/WEO   
Japan  1600-1650  Kimura  Rice prices, Osaka 
  1818-1871  Bunko  Rice prices, Osaka 
  1860-1935 Williamson  et.  al.   
  1900-2007 GFD/WEO   
 Kenya  1947-2007 GFD/WEO   
Malaysia  1948-2007 GFD/WEO   
Mauritius  1946-2007 GFD/WEO   
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Table AI.1 Prices: Consumer or cost-of-living indices-continued 
 (unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Sources  Commentary 
Mexico  1786-1821 Garner  Zacatecas   
  1877-1940 Williamson  et.  al.   
  1918-2007 GFD/WEO   
Morocco  1939-3007 GFD/WEO   
Myanmar (Burma)  1870-1940 Williamson  et.  al.   
  1939-2007 GFD/WEO   
Netherlands  1500-1800 Van  Zanden   
  1800-1913 Van  Riel   
  1880-2007 GFD/WEO   
New Zealand  1857-2004 Statistics  New  Zealand   
  1980-2007 WEO   
Nicaragua  1937-2007 GFD/WEO   
Nigeria  1953-2007 GFD/WEO   
Norway  1516-2005 Grytten   
  1980-2007 WEO   
Panama  1939-2000 OXD   
  1980-2007 WEO   
Paraguay  1938-2007 GFD/WEO   
  1750-1816 Garner  Potosi 
Peru  1790-1841 Garner  Lima   
  1800-1873 
1913-2000 
Diaz et. al.   
  1980-2007 WEO   
Philippines  1899-1940 Williamson  et.  al.   
 1937-2007  GFD/WEO   
Poland  1701-1815  Hoffman et. al.  Oats Prices-Warsaw 
  1816-1914 Allen  Warsaw 
  1921-1939 
1983-2007 
GFD/WEO  
Portugal  1728-1893  Hoffman et. al.  Wheat prices 
  1881-1997  Bordo et. al.   
  1980-2007 WEO   
Romania  1779-1831  Hoffman et. al.  Wheat prices, Wallachia 
  1971-2007 WEO   
Russia  1853-1910  Borodkin  Wheat and rye flour, St. 
Petesburg 
  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer   
 1917-1924,  1927-1940, 
1944-1972, 1991-2007 
GFD/WEO  
Singapore  1948-2007 GFD/WEO   
South Africa  1895-2007 GFD/WEO   
Spain  1500-1650 Hamilton  Valencia 
  1651-1800 Hamilton,  Hoffman  et. 
al. 
Wheat, eggs, and linen 
prices 
  1800-2000  Diaz et. al.   
  1980-2000 WEO   
Sri Lanka  1939-2007 GFD/WEO   
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Table AI.1 Prices: Consumer or cost-of-living indices-concluded 
 (unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Sources  Commentary 
Sweden  1732-1800  Hoffman et. al.  Wheat prices 
  1800-2000 Edvinsson  
  1980-2007 WEO   
Taiwan  1897-1939 Williamson  et.  al.   
  1980-2007 WEO   
Thailand (Siam)  1820-1941 Williamson  et.  al.   
 1948-2007  GFD/WEO     
Tunisia  1939-2007 GFD/WEO   
Turkey  1469-1914 Pamuk  Istanbul 
 1854-1941  Williamson  et.  al.   
 1922-2007  GFD/WEO   
United Kingdom  1450-1999  Van Zanden  Southern England 
 1781-2007  GFD/WEO   
United States  1720-1789  Historical Statistics of 
the United States 
Wholesale prices 
  1774-2003  Historical Statistics of 
the United States 
 
 1980-2007  WEO   
     
Uruguay  1870-1940 Williamson  et.  al.   
  1929-2000 OXF   
  1980-2007 WEO   
Venezuela  1830-2002 Baptista   
 1914-2007  GFD/WEO   
Zambia  1938-2007 GFD/WEO   
Zimbabwe  1920-1970 Mitchell   
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Table AI.2 Modern Nominal Exchange Rates 
(Domestic currency units per US dollar and other currencies noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Other relevant rates 
Algeria  1831-2007 GFD/IFS  French  francs/euro 
Angola  1921-2007 GFD/IFS   
Argentina  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer  French francs 
 1885-2007  GFD/IFS   
Australia  1835-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Austria  1814-2007  GFD/IFS  UK pound, German DM 
Belgium  1830-2007 GFD/IFS  French  francs 
Bolivia  1863-2007 GFD/IFS   
Brazil  1812-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Canada  1858-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Central African 
Republic 
1900-2007 GFD/IFS  French  francs 
Chile  1830-1995  Braun et. al.  UK pound 
 1878-2007  GFD/IFS   
China  1848-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Colombia  1900-2000 OXF  UK  pound 
 1919-2007  GDF/IFS   
Costa Rica  1921-2007 GDF/IFS   
Denmark  1864-2007  GDF/IFS  UK pound, German DM 
Dominican Republic  1905-2007 GDF/IFS   
Ecuador  1898-2000 OXF,  Picks   
  1980-2007 IFS   
Egypt  1869-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
El Salvador  1870-2007 GFD/IFS   
Finland  1900-2007 GFD/IFS  German  DM 
France  1619-1810  ESTDB/Course of the 
Exchange 
UK pound 
  1800-2007  GFD/IFS  UK pound, German DM 
Germany  1698-1810  ESTDB/Course of the 
Exchange 
UK pound 
  1795-2007 GFD/IFS   
Greece  1872-1939 Lazaretou  UK pound, German DM 
  1901-2007 GFD/IFS   
Guatemala  1900-2007 GFD/IFS   
Honduras  1870-2007 GFD/IFS   
Hungary  1900-2007 GFD/IFS  Austrian  schilling 
India  1823-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Indonesia  1876-2007 GFD/IFS  Dutch  guilder 
Italy  1816-2007  GFD/IFS  UK pound, German DM 
Japan  1862-2007  GFD/IFS   UK pound 
Kenya  1898-2007  GFD/IFS   UK pound 
Korea  1905-2007 GFD/IFS  Japanese  yen 
Malaysia   1900-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Mauritius  1900-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Mexico  1814-2007  GFD/IFS  UK pound, French franc 
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Table AI.2 Modern Nominal Exchange Rates-concluded 
(Domestic currency units per US dollar and other currencies noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Other relevant rates 
Morocco  1897-2007 GFD/IFS  French  franc/euro 
Myanmar (Burma)  1900-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Netherlands  1698-1810  ESTDB/Course of the 
Exchange 
UK pound 
  1792-2007  GFD/IFS   German DM 
New Zealand  1892-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Nicaragua  1912-2007 GFD/IFS   
Nigeria  1900-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Norway  1819-2007 GFD/IFS  Swedish  krona,  German 
DM 
Panama  1900-2007 GFD/IFS   
Paraguay  1900-2000 OXD  Argentine  peso 
  1980-2007 IFS   
Peru  1883-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Philippines  1893-2007 GFD/IFS  Spanish  peseta 
Poland  1916-2007 GFD/IFS   
Portugal  1750-1865  Course of the Exchange  Dutch grooten 
  1794-2007  GDF/IFS  UK pound, German DM 
Romania  1921-2007 GDF/IFS   
Russia   1815-2007 GFD/IFS  French  franc 
 1814-2007  GFD   
  1900-2000 OXF/IFS   
Singapore  1834-2007   GFD/IFS  UK pound 
South Africa  1900-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Spain  1814-2007 GFD/IFS  German  DM 
Sri Lanka  1900-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Sweden  1814-2007  GDF/IFS  UK pound, German DM 
Taiwan  1895-2007  GDF/IFS  UK pound, Japanese yen 
Thailand (Siam)  1859-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Tunisia  1900-2007 GFD/IFS  French  franc 
Turkey  1859-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
United Kingdom  1619-1810  ESTDB/Course of the 
Exchange 
French franc 
  1660-2007 GFD/IFS   
United States  1660-2007 GFD/IFS   
Uruguay  1900-2007 GFD/IFS   
Venezuela  1900-2007 GFD/IFS   
Zambia  1900-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
Zimbabwe  1900-2007 GFD/IFS  UK  pound 
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Table AI.3 Early Silver-based Exchange Rates 
(Domestic currency units per UK pence) 
Country 
 
Period Covered  Source  Currency/Commentary 
Austria  1371-1860  RR, Table A4  kreuzer, Vienna 
Belgium  1349-1801 RR,  Table  A4  Hoet 
France  1258-1789  RR, Table A4  livre tournois 
Germany  1350-1830  RR, Table A4  composite pfenning 
Italy  1289-1858 RR,  Table  A4 lira  fiorentina 
Netherlands  1366-1800 RR,  Table  A4  Composite 
Portugal  1750-1855 RR,  Table  A4  Reis 
Russia  1761-1840  RR, Table A4  common ruble 
Spain  1351-1809 RR,  Table  A4  Composite 
Sweden  1523-1573  RR, Table A4  mark ortug 
Turkey  1555-1914 RR,  Table  A4  Akche 
 
Table AI.4 Silver Content of Currencies 
Country 
 
Period Covered  Sources  Currency/Commentary 
Austria  1371-1860  Allen & Unger  kreuzer, Vienna 
Belgium  1349-1801 Korthals  Hoet 
France  1258-1789  Allen & Unger  livre tournois 
Germany  1350-1798  Allen & Unger  pfenning/Frankfurt 
  1417-1830   pfenning/Augsburg 
Italy  1289-1858 Malanima  lira  fiorentina 
Netherlands  1366-1575  Allen & Unger  Flemish grote 
  1450-1800 Van  Zanden  Guilder 
Portugal  1750-1855 Godinho  Reis 
Russia  1761-1840  Lindert, Mironov  common ruble 
  1761-1815   Assignatzia 
Spain  1351-1650  Allen & Unger  dinar, Valencia 
  1501-1800   vellon  maravedis,  New 
Castille 
  1630-1809 Montfort  Real 
Sweden  1523-1573 Soderberg  mark  ortug 
Turkey  1555-1914  Ozmukur & Pamuk  Akche 
United Kindgom  1261-1918  Allen & Unger  Pence 
United States  1800-1979  Allen & Unger  Dollar 
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Table AI.5 Nominal and Real Gross National Product and Output Index 
(Domestic currency units) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Algeria  1950-2007 GFD/WEO/IFS   
Angola  1962-2007 
1969-2007 
GFD/WEO/IFS  
Argentina  1884-1913  Flandreau & Zumer  Nominal 
  1875-2000  Diaz et. al.  Index of total production 
(1995=100) 
  1900-2000  OXF   Real (base=1970) 
 1900-2007  GFD/WEO   
Australia  1798-2007 GFD/WEO  Nominal 
  1820-2000  Diaz.et. al.  Index of total production 
(1995=100) 
Austria     
Belgium  1835-2007 BNB,  Centre  d'études 
économiques de la KUL 
Nominal 
Bolivia     
Brazil  1861-2007 GFD/WEO  Nominal 
  1850-2000  Diaz et. al.  Index of total production 
(1995=100) 
  1900-2000 OXF  (base=1970) 
Canada     
Central African 
Republic 
   
Chile  1810-2000  Diaz et. al.  Index of total production 
(1995=100) 
China     
NNP 1962-1999  GFD  
Colombia  1900-2000 OXF  Real,  (base=1970) 
  1925-1999 GFD   
Costa Rica  1947-1999 GFD   
Cote D’ Ivoire     
Denmark  1818-1975 Nordic  Historical 
National Accounts 
 
Dominican Republic     
Ecuador     
Egypt  1886-1945 Yousef   
  1952-2007 GFD/WEO   
 1821-1859  Landes  Cotton  output 
El Salvador     
Finland  1860-2001 Nordic  Historical 
National Accounts 
 
France     
Germany     
Greece  1833-1939 Kostelenos  et.  al.   
  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer   
GNI 1927-1999  GFD   
 1948-1999  GFD   
Guatemala     
Honduras     
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Table AI.5 Nominal and Real Gross National Product and Output Index 
(Domestic currency units) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
India  1900-1921, 1948-2007  GFD/WEO   
  1861-1899  Brahamanda  Real, per capita 
  1820-2000  Diaz et. al.  Index of total production 
Indonesia  1815-1913 VanZanden  Java 
  1910-1970  Bassino and Van der 
Eng 
 
  1921-1939, 1951-1999  GFD   
  1911-1938, 1953-1999  GFD   
     
Korea  1911-1940  Myun Soo Cha and Nak 
Kim 
Thousand yen,GNI also 
calculated 
GNI 1953-1999  GFD   
Malaysia  1910-1970  Bassino and Van der 
Eng 
 
  1949-1999 GFD   
Mexico  1820-2000  DIA  Index of total production 
(1995=100) 
  1900-2000 OXF   
  1900-2000 OXF  Real,  (base=1970) 
   1925-1999  GFD    
Myanmar (Burma)  1913-1970  Bassino and Van der 
Eng 
 
  1950-1999 GFD   
Netherlands  1800-1913 National  Accounts  of 
the Netherlands 
 
Norway  1830-2003 Grytten   
Peru  1900-2000 OXF  Real  (base=1970) 
  1900-2000 OXF  Nominal 
  1942-1999 GFD   
Philippines  1910-1970  Bassino and Van der 
Eng 
 
 1946-2997  GFD/WEO   
Poland     
Portugal     
Russia  1885-1913  Flandreau & Zumer  Nominal 
GNI 1928-1940,  1945-1995  GFD   
 1979-1997  GFD   
 1992-1999  GFD  Production 
South Africa  1911-1999 GFD   
Spain     
Sri Lanka  1900-1970  Bassino and Van der 
Eng 
 
Sweden  1720-2000 
1800-2000 
Edvinsson  Real, per capita 
Nominal and real 
Taiwan  1910-1970  Bassino and Van der 
Eng 
 
Thailand (Siam)     
  1946-2007 GFD/WEO   
  1910-1970  Bassino and Van der 
Eng 
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Table AI.5 Nominal and Real Gross National Product and Output Index 




Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Tunisia     
     
Turkey  1923-2005   Nominal 
 1950-1999  GFD   
United Kingdom  1830-1999 GFD  GNI 
 1948-1999  GFD   
United States  1790-2002  Historical Statistics of 
the United States 
Real, per capita 
 1948-1999  GFD   
Uruguay  1935-1999 GFD   
  1955-2000 OXF   
 1900-2000  OXF  Real  (base=1970) 
GNI 1955-1999  GFD   
Venezuela  1830-2002 Baptista   
 1900-2000  OXF  Real  (base=1970) 
 1950-2007  GFD/WEO   
Zambia     
Zimbabwe     
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Table AI.6 Gross National Product: PPP in constant dollars 
(also available on a per capita basis) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Algeria  1950-2005 MAD/TED   
  1820-2005 RR  Interpolation  1821-1949 
Angola  1950-2005 MAD/TED   
Argentina  1875-2000  Diaz et. al  (base=1996) 
 1900-2005  MAD/TED   
  1870-2005  RR  Interpolation 1871-1899  
Australia  1820-2006 MAD/TED   
Austria  1870-2006 MAD/TED   
 1820-2006  RR  Interpolation  1821-1869 
Belgium  1846-2006 MAD/TED   
 1820-2006  RR  Interpolation  1821-1845 
Bolivia  1945-2005 MAD/TED   
  1936-2005 RR  Interpolation  1936-1944 
Brazil  1820-2000 DIA  (base=1996) 
 1870-2005  MAD/TED   
 1820-2005  RR  Interpolation  1821-1869 
Canada  1870-2006 MAD/TED   
 1820-2006  RR  Interpolation  1821-1869 
Central African 
Republic 
1950-2003 MAD   
Chile  1810-2000 Diaz  et.  Al.  (base=1996) 
  1820-2005 MAD/TED   
China  1929-1938 
1950-2006 
MAD/TED  
Colombia  1900-2005 MAD/TED   
Costa Rica  1920-2005 MAD/TED   
Denmark  1820-2006 MAD/TED   
Dominican Republic  1950-2005 MAD/TED   
  1942-2005 RR  Interpolation  1942-1949 
Ecuador  1939-2005 MAD/TED   
  1900-2000 OXF  (base=1970) 
  1900-2005 RR  Interpolation  1900-1938 
Egypt   1950-2005 MAD/TED   
  1820-2005 RR  Interpolation  1821-1949 
El Salvador  1900-2000 OXF  (base=1970) 
Finland  1860-2006 MAD/TED   
 1820-2006  RR  Interpolation  1821-1859 
France  1820-2006 MAD/TED   
Germany  1850-2006 MAD/TED   
  1820-2006 RR  Interpolation  1821-1849 
Greece  1921-2006 MAD/TED   
  1820-2006 RR  Interpolation  1821-1920 
Guatemala  1920-2005 MAD/TED   
Honduras  1920-2005 MAD/TED   
Hungary  1824-2006 MAD/TED   
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Table AI.6 Gross National Product: PPP in constant dollars 
(also available on a per capita basis) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
India  1884-2006 MAD/TED   
  1820-2006 RR  Interpolation  1821-1883 
Indonesia  1870-2005 MAD/TED   
  1820-2005 RR  Interpolation  1821-1869 
Japan  1870-2006 MAD/TED   
  1820-2006 RR  Interpolation  1821-1869 
Kenya  1950-2005 MAD/TED   
Korea  1911-2006 MAD/TED   
  1820-2006 RR  Interpolation  1821-1910 
Malaysia  1911-2005 MAD/TED   
 1820-2006  RR  Interpolation  1821-1910 
Mauritius  1950-2005 MAD/TED   
Mexico  1900-2006 MAD/TED   
  1820-2006 RR  Interpolation  1821-1899 
Morocco  1950-2005 MAD/TED   
 1820-2005  RR  Interpolation  1821-1949 
Myanmar (Burma)  1950-2005 MAD/TED   
  1820-2005 RR  Interpolation  1821-1949 
Panama  1945-2005 MAD/TED   
  1939-2005 RR  Interpolation  1939-1944 
Paraguay  1939-2005 MAD/TED   
Peru   1895-2005 MAD/TED   
Philippines  1902-2005 MAD/TED   
  1870-2005 RR  Interpolation  1871-1901 
Poland  1929-1938 
1950-2006 
MAD/TED   
  1870-2005 RR  Interpolation  1871-1928 
Portugal  1865-2006 MAD/TED   
  1820-2006 RR  Interpolation  1821-1864 
Romania  1926-1938 
1950-2006 
MAD/TED   
Russia  1928-2006 MAD/TED   
Singapore  1950-2005 MAD/TED   
 1820-2005  RR  Interpolation  1821-1949 
South Africa  1950-2005 MAD/TED   
  1905-2005 RR  Interpolation  1905-1949 
Spain  1850-2006 MAD/TED   
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Table AI.6 Gross National Product: PPP in constant dollars 
(also available on a per capita basis) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Sweden  1820-2006 MAD/TED   
Thailand (Siam)  1950-2005 MAD/TED   
  1820-2005 RR  Interpolation  1821-1949 
Tunisia  1950-2005 MAD/TED   
  1820-2005 RR  Interpolation  1821-1949 
Turkey  1923-2005 MAD/TED   
United Kingdom  1830-2006 MAD/TED   
 1820-2006  RR  Interpolation  1821-1829 
United States  1870-2006 MAD/TED   
  1820-2006 RR  Interpolation  1821-1869 
Uruguay  1870-2005 MAD/TED   
Venezuela  1900-2005 MAD/TED   
 1820-2005  RR  Interpolation  1821-1899 
Zambia  1950-2005 MAD/TED   
Zimbabwe  1950-2005 MAD/TED   
 1919-2005  MAD/TED   
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Table AI.7 Central Government Expenditure and Revenue 
(Domestic currency units unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Sources  Commentary 
Algeria  1834-1960 
1964-1975 
1994-1996 
MIT  Revenues begin in 1830 
  1963-2003 KRV   
Angola  1915-1973 MIT   
  1980-2003 KRV   
Argentina  1864-1999 MIT   
  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer   
 1963-2003  KRV   
Australia  1839-1900  MIT  Revenues begin in 1824, 
New South Wales and 
other provinces circa 
1840 
 1901-1997  MIT  Commonwealth 
  1965-2003 KRV   
Austria  1791-1993  MIT  World War I and II, 
missing data 
  1965-2003 KRV   
Belgium  1830-1993    World War I missing 
data 
  1965-2003 KRV   
Bolivia  1888-1999  MIT  Revenues begin 1885 
  1963-2003 KRV   
Brazil  1823-1994 IBGE/MIT  
 1980-2003  KRV   
Canada  1806-1840 MIT  Lower  Canada 
  1824-1840   Upper  Canada 
  1867-1995   Canada 






  1963-2003 KRV   
Chile  1810-1995  Braun et. al.  (base=1995) 
  1857-1998 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
China  1927-1936 Cheng  Nationalist  goverrment 
  1963-2003 KRV   
Colombia  1905-1999 MIT   
 1963-2003  KRV   
Costa Rica  1884-1999 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
Cote D’Ivoire  1895-1912 
1926-1999 
MIT  
  1963-2003 KRV   
Denmark  1853-1993 MIT   
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Table AI.7 Central Government Expenditure and Revenue 
(Domestic currency units unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Sources  Commentary 
Dominican Republic  1905-1999 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
Ecuador  1884-1999 MIT   
  1979-2003 KRV   
Egypt  1821-1879 Landes   
  1852-1999 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
El Salvador  1883-1999 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
Finland  1882-1993 MIT   
  1965-2003 KRV   
France  1600-1785 ESFDB   
  1815-1993 MIT   
  1965-2003 KRV   
Germany (Prussia)  1688-1806 ESFDB   
Germany  1872-1934  MIT  Revenues end in 1942 
  1946-1993   West  Germany 
  1979-2003 KRV   
Greece  1885-1940 
1954-1993 
MIT Expenditure  begins  in 
1833 and again in 1946 
  1963-2003 KRV   
Guatemala  1882-1999 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
Honduras  1879-1999 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
Hungary  1868-1940 MIT   
India  1810-2000 MIT   
 1963-2003  KRV   
Indonesia  1821-1940  Mellegers  Netherlands East Indies, 
florins, high government 
  1816-1939 
1959-1999 
MIT  
  1963-2003 KRV   
Italy  1862-1993 MIT   
  1965-2003 KRV   
Japan  1868-1993 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
Kenya  1895-2000 MIT   
  1970-2003 KRV   
Korea  1905-1939 MIT  Japanese  yen 
 1949-1997   South  Korea 
  1963-2003 KRV   
Malaysia  1883-1938 MIT  Malaya 
  1946-1999    
  1963-2003 KRV   
Mauritius  1812-2000 MIT   
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Table AI.7 Central Government Expenditure and Revenue 
(Domestic currency units unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Sources  Commentary 
Mexico  1825-1998 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
Morocco  1938-2000 MIT  Revenues  also  1920-
1929 
 1963-2003  KRV   
Myanmar (Burma)  1946-1999 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
Netherlands  1845-1993 MIT   
  1965-2003 KRV   
New Zealand  1841-2000 MIT   
  1965-2003 KRV   
Nicaragua  1900-1999 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
Nigeria  1874-1998 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
Norway  1850-1992 MIT   
  1965-2003 KRV   
Panama  1909-1996 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
Paraguay  1881-1900 
1913-1993 
MIT Revenues  through  1902 
  1963-2003 KRV   
Peru  1846-1998 MIT   
 1963-2003  KRV   
Philippines  1901-2000  MIT  World War II missing 
data 
  1963-2003 KRV   




Portugal  1879-1902 
1917-1992 
MIT  
 1975-2003  KRV   
Romania  1883-1992 MIT  Expenditure  begins  in 
1862 
Russia  1769-1815 ESFDB   




 1914-1921  Katzenellenbaum   
 1931-1951  Condoide  National  budget 
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Table AI.7 Central Government Expenditure and Revenue 
(Domestic currency units unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Sources  Commentary 
South Africa  1826-1904  MIT  Natal begins in 1850 
 1905-2000    
  1963-2003 KRV   
Spain  1520-1553 
1753-1788 
ESFDB Not  continuous 
  1850-1997 MIT   
  1965-2003 KRV   
Sri Lanka  1811-2000 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
Sweden  1881-1993 MIT   
  1980-2003 KRV   
Taiwan  1898-1938 
1950-2000 
MIT  
Thailand (Siam)  1891-2000  MIT  Revenue begins in 1851 
  1963-2003 KRV   
Tunisia  1909-1954 
1965-1999 
MIT  
  1963-2003 KRV   
Turkey  1923-2000 MIT   
 1963-2003  KRV   
United Kingdom  1486-1815 ESFDB   
 1791-1993  MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
United States  1789-1994 MIT   
 1960-2003  KRV   
Uruguay  1871-1999 MIT   
  1963-2003 KRV   
Venezuela  1830-1998 MIT   
 1963-2003  KRV   
  1963-2003 KRV   
Zambia  1963-2003 KRV   
Zimbabwe  1894-1997 MIT   
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Table AI.8 Total Exports and Imports 
(local currency units and US$, as noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Sources  Currency/ 
Commentary 
Algeria  1831-2007 GFD/WEO   
Angola  1891-2007 GFD/WEO   
Argentina  1864-2007 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
 1885-2007  GFD/WEO  US$ 
  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer  Exports 
Australia  1826-2007 GFD/WEO   
Austria  1831-2007    
Belgium  1846-2007 GFD/WEO   
 1816-2007  GFD/WEO  US$ 
Bolivia  1899-1935 GFD  Lcu 
  1899-2007   US$ 
Brazil  1821-2007 GFD/WEO     
  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer  Exports 
Canada  1832-2007 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
  1867-2007   US$ 
Chile  1857-1967 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
China  1865-1937 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
  1950-2007    
Colombia  1835-1938   Lcu 
  1919-2007 GFD/WEO  US$ 
Costa Rica  1854-1938 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
  1921-2007   US$ 
Cote D’Ivoire  1892-2007 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
  1900-2007   US$ 
Denmark  1841-2007  GFD/WEO  Exports begin in 1818, 
lcu 
  1865-2007   US$ 
Ecuador  1889-1949 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
  1924-2007   US$ 
Egypt  1850-2007 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
  1869-2007   US$ 
El Salvador  1859-1988  GFD/WEO  Exports begin in 1854, 
lcu 
  1870-2007   US$ 
Finland  1818-2007 GFD/WEO    Lcu 
  1900-2007   US$ 
France  1800-2007 GFD/WEO   
Germany  1880-2007 GFD/WEO   
Ghana  1850-2007 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
  1900-2007   US$ 
Greece  1849-2007 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
  1900-2007   US$ 
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Table AI.8 Total Exports and Imports 
(local currency units and US$, as noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Sources  Currency 
Honduras  1896-2007 GFD/WEO   
India  1832-2007 GFD/WEO   
Indonesia  1823-1974 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
  1876-2007   US$ 
Italy  1861-2007 GFD/WEO   
Japan  1862-2007 GFD/WEO   
Kenya  1900-2007 GFD/WEO   
Korea  1886-1936 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
  1905-2007   US$ 
Malaysia  1905-2007 GFD/WEO  Includes  Singapore  until 
1955 
Mauritius  1833-2007 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
  1900-2007   US$ 
Mexico  1797-1830 GFD/WEO  UK  pound 
  1872-2007   Lcu 
  1797-1830   US$ 
 1872-2007    
Morocco  1947-2007 GFD/WEO   
Myanmar (Burma)  1937-2007 GFD/WEO   
Netherlands  1846-2007 GFD/WEO   
Nicaragua  1895-2007 GFD/WEO   
Norway  1851-2007 GFD/WEO   
Panama  1905-2007 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
Paraguay  1879-1949 GFD/WEO  US$ 
  1923-2007    
Peru  1866-1952 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
  1882-2007   US$ 
Philippines  1884-2007 GFD/WEO     
Poland  1924-2007 GFD/WEO     
Portugal  1861-2007 GFD/WEO   
Romania  1862-1993 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
  1921-2007   US$ 
Russia  1802-1991 GFD/WEO    Lcu 
 1815-2007   US$ 
Singapore  1948-2007 GFD/WEO     
South Africa  1826-2007 GFD/WEO    Lcu 
 1900-2007   US$ 
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Table AI.8 Total Exports and Imports 
(local currency units and US$, as noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Sources  Currency 
Spain  1822-2007 GFD/WEO     
Sri Lanka  1825-2007 GFD/WEO  Lcu 
  1900-2007   US$ 
Sweden  1832-2007 GFD/WEO   
Taiwan  1891-2007 GFD/WEO   
Thailand (Siam)  1859-2007 GFD/WEO     
Turkey  1878-2007 GFD/WEO   
United Kingdom  1796-2007 GFD/WEO   
United States  1788-2007 GFD/WEO   
Uruguay  1862-1930 GFD/WEO   
 1899-2007    
Venezuela  1830-2007 GFD/WEO   
 1900-2007    
Zambia  1908-2007 GFD/WEO   
Zimbabwe  1900-2007 GFD/WEO   
 
Table AI.9 Global Indicators and Financial Centers 
Country 
 
Series Period  covered  Sources 
United Kingdom  Current account 
balance/GDP 
1816-2006  Imlah, Mitchell, and  
United Kingdom 
National Statistics 
  Consol rate  1790-2007  GFD and Bank of 
England 
  Discount rate  1790-2007  GFD and Bank of 
England 
United States  Current account 
balance/GDP 
1790-2006  Historical Statistics of 
the United States, WEO 
  60-90 day commercial 
paper 
1830-1900  Historical Statistics of 
the United States 
  Discount rate  1915-2007  GFD and Board of 
Governors of the 
Federal Reserve 
  Federal funds rate  1950-2007  Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve 
  Long-term bond 
 
 
1798-2007  Historical Statistics of 
the United States, Board 
of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve 
World  Commodity prices, 
nominal and real 
1790-1850  Gayer, Rostow, and 
Schwartz 
   1854-1990  Boughton-IMF 
   1862-1999  Economist 
  1980-2007  WEO 
 Sovereign  external 
default dates 
1341-2007  Macdonald, Purcell and 
Kaufman, Reinhart, 
Rogoff, and Savastano, 
Suter, and Standard and 
Poor’s 
   110
Appendix II.  Public Debt  
 
This data appendix covers the government debt series used, while Appendix I is devoted to 
the database on macro time series. 
 
Abbreviations of  frequently-used sources (additional sources listed in tables below) 
 
CLYPS: Cowan, Levy-Yeyati, Panizza, Sturzenegger 
ESFDB:  European State Finance Data Base 
GFD: Global Financial Data, The World Bank 
IFS:  International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
LM: Lindert & Morton 
LofN: League of Nations 
MAR: Marichal 
MIT: Mitchell 
RR: Reinhart and Rogoff 
UN: United Nations 
WEO: World Economic Outlook, IMF 
Lcu: local currency units 
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Table AII. 1 Public Debentures: External Government Bond Issues 
Country 
 
Period covered  Sources  Commentary 
Argentina  1824-1968  LM, MAR  Includes first loan 
 1927-1946  UN   
Australia  1857-1978 Attard,  LM   
 1927-1946  UN   
Bolivia  1864-1930 MAR   
  1927-1946 UN   
Brazil  1843-1970 Bazant,  LM,  MAR, 
Summerhill 
Includes first loan 
 1928-1946  UN   
Canada  1860-1919 LM   
 1928-1946  UN   
Chile  1822-1830  LM, MAR  Includes first loan 
  1928-1946 UN   
China  1865-1938 Huang,  Winkler   
Colombia  1822-1929 MAR   
  1928-1946 UN   
Costa Rica  1871-1930 MAR   
Egypt  1862-1965  Landes, LM  Includes first loan 
  1928-1946 UN   
El Salvador  1922-1930 MAR   
  1928-1946 UN   
Greece  1824-1932  Levandis  Includes first loan 
(Independence loan) 
  1928-1939 UN   
Guatemala  1856-1930 MAR   
 1928-1939  UN   
Honduras  1867-1930 MAR   
India     
  1928-1945 UN   
Japan  1870-1965  LM  Includes first loan 
  1928-1939 UN   
Mexico  1824-1946 Bazant,  LM,  MAR  Includes first loan 
 1928-1944  UN   
Panama  1923-1930    
  1928-1945 UN   
Peru  1822-1930  MAR  Includes first loan 
 1928-1945  UN   
Russia  1815-1916  Crisp, LM, Miller   
South Africa  1928-1946 UN   
Thailand (Siam)  1928-1947 UN   
Turkey  1854-1965  Clay, LM  Includes first loan 
 1933-1939  UN   
Uruguay  1871-1939 MAR   
 1928-1947  UN   
Venezuela  1822-1930  MAR  Includes first loan 
 1928-1947  UN   
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Table AII.2 Total (Domestic plus External) Public Debt 
(currency units are noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Argentina  1863-1971 Garcia  Vizcaino  Lcu 
 1914-1981  LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1980-2005  GFD,  Jeanne  & 
Guscina 
 
Australia  1852-1914 Page   
 1914-1981  LofN/UN  Lcu 




Austria  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1945-1984 UN  Lcu 
  1970-2006 Austrian  Federal 
Financing Agency 
euros 
Belgium  1830-2005 BNB,  Centre  d'études 
économiques de la 
KUL 
euros 
Bolivia  1914-1953 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1968-1981    
  1991-2004 CLYPS  US$ 
Brazil  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
 1923-1972  LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1991-2005  GFD,  Jeanne  & 
Guscina 
 
Canada  1867-2007 Statistics  Canada, 
Bank of Canada 
Lcu 
Chile  1827-2000  Diaz et. al.  Lcu 
  1914-1953 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1990-2007 Ministerio  de 
Hacienda 
US$ 
China  1894-1950  Cheng, Huang, RR   
  1981-2005 GFD,  Jeanne  & 
Guscina 
 
Colombia  1923-2006 Contraloria  General 
de la Republica 
Lcu 
Costa Rica  1892-1914 Soley-Guell  Lcu 
  1914-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2007 CLYPS,  Ministerio  de 
Hacienda 
US$ 
Cote D’Ivoire  1970-1980 UN  Lcu 
Denmark  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1914-1975 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1990-2007 Danmark’s  National 
Bank 
Lcu 
Dominican Republic  1914-1952 LofN/UN  Lcu 
Ecuador  1914-1972 LofN/UN  Lcu 










Table AII.2 Total (Domestic plus External) Public Debt-continued 
(currency units are noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Egypt  1914-1959 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  2001-2005  Ministry of Finance  Lcu 
El Salvador  1914-1963 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1976-1983    
  1990-2004 CLYPS  US$ 
  2003-2007 Banco  Central  de 
Reserva 
US$ 
Finland  1914-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1978-2007 State  Treasury  Finland  Lcu 
France  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1913-1972 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1999-2007  Ministère du Budget, 
des comptes public 
Lcu 
Germany  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1914-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1950-2007 Bundesbank  Lcu 
Greece  1869-1893  Levandis  Not continuous, Lcu 
  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1920-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1993-2006 OECD   
Guatemala  1921-1982 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2005 CLYPS  US$ 
Honduras  1914-1971 LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1980-2005  CLYPS  US$ 
Hungary  1913-1942 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1992-2005  Jeanne & Guscina   
India  1840-1920 Statistical  Abstract 
Relating to British India 
 
  1913-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2005  Jeanne & Guscina   
Indonesia  1972-1983 UN  Lcu 
  1998-2005 Bank  Indonesia/GDF   
Italy  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1914-1894 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1982-2007 Dipartamento  del 
Tesoro 
Lcu 
Japan  1872-2007  Historical Statistics of 
Japan/Bank of Japan 
Lcu 
Kenya  1911-1935 Frankel  UK  pounds 
  1961-1980 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1997-2007  Central Bank of Kenya  Lcu 
Korea  1910-1938  Mizoguchi & Umemura  Yen 
  1970-1984 LofN/UN   
  1990-2004  Jeanne & Guscina   
Malaysia  1947-1957 UN  Lcu 
  1976-1981    
  1980-2004  Jeanne & Guscina   
Mauritius  1970-1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 





Table AII.2. Total (Domestic plus External) Public Debt-continued 
(currency units are noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Mexico  1814-1946 Bazant  Not continuous 
 1914-1979  LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2006  Direccion General de la 
Deuda Publica 
 
Morocco  1965-1980 UN  Lcu 
Netherlands  1880-1914  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1914-1977 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1914-2008  Dutch State Treasury 
Agency 
Lcu 
New Zealand  1858-2006 Statistics  New 
Zealand/NZ Treasury  
Lcu 
Nicaragua  1914-1945 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1970-1983    
  1991-2005 CLYPS  US$ 
Norway  1880-1914  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1913-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1965-2007  Ministry of Finance  Lcu 
Panama  1915-1983 LofN/UN  US$ 
  1980-2005 CLYPS  US$ 
Paraguay  1927-1947 
1976-1982 
LofN/UN Lcu 
  1990-2004 CLYPS  US$ 
Peru  1918-1970 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1990-2005 CLYPS  US$ 
Philippines  1948-1982 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2005  GFD, Jeanne & Guscina   
Poland  1920-1947 LofN/UN   
  1994-2004  GFD, Jeanne & Guscina   
Portugal  1851-1997 INE-Portugese 
Statistical Agency 
 
 1914-1975  LofN/UN    Lcu 
  1980-2007  Banco de Portugal  In euros from 1999 
Russia  1880-1914  Crisp, Flandreau & 
Zumer 
French francs and Lcu 
 1922-1938  LofN/UN     
Lcu 
  1993-2005  Jeanne & Guscina   
Singapore  1969-1982 UN  Lcu 
  1986-2006 Monetary  Authority  Lcu 
South Africa  1859-1914 Page  UK  pounds 
  1910-1982 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1946-2006 South  Africa  Reserve 
Bank 
Lcu   115
Appendix Table AII.2 Total (Domestic plus External) Public Debt-concluded 
(currency units are noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Spain  1504-1679 ESFDB  Not  continuous 
  1850-2001 Estadisticas  Historicas 
de España: Siglos XIX-
XX 
Lcu 
  1999-2006  Banco de España  Euro 
Sri Lanka  1861-1914 Page  UK  pounds 
  1950-1983 UN  Lcu 
  1990-2006  Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka 
Lcu 
Sweden  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer   
  1914-1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1950-2006 Riksgälden Lcu 
Thailand (Siam)  1913-1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2006  Jeanne & Guscina, Bank 
of Thailand 
 
Tunisia  1972-1982 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  2004-2007  Central Bank of Tunisia  Lcu 
Turkey  1933-1984 LofN/UN   Lcu 
 1986-2007  Turkish  Treasury  US$ 
United Kingdom  1693-1786 Quinn  Total  funded  debt 
 1781-1915  Bazant,  Page 1787-1815,  not 
contiuous 
  1850-2007  UK Debt Management 
Office 
 
United States  1791-2007 Treasury  Direct   
Uruguay  1914-1947 
1972-1984 
LofN/UN Lcu 
 1999-2007  Banco  Central  del 
Uruguay 
US$ 
Venezuela  1914-1982 LofN/UN   
  1983-2005  Jeanne & Guscina   
Zimbabwe  1924-1936 Frankel  UK  pounds 
  1969-1982 UN   
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Table AII.3 External Public Debt 
(currency units are noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Algeria  1970-2005 GFD  US$ 
Angola  1989-2005 GFD  US$ 
Argentina  1863-1971 Garcia  Vizcaino  Lcu 
  1914-1981 LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1970-2005  GFD  US$ 
Australia  1852-1914 Page   
  1914-1981 LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1980-2007  Australian  Office  of 
Financial Management 
Lcu 
Austria  1945-1984 UN  Lcu 
  1970-2006 Austrian  Federal 
Financing Agency 
euros 
Belgium  1914-1981 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1992-2007    
Bolivia  1914-1953 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1968-1981    
  1970-2005 GFD   
  1991-2004 CLYPS  US$ 
Brazil  1824-2000  IBGE  £s and US$ 
 1923-1972  LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1970-2005  GFD  US$ 
  1991-2005  Jeanne & Guscina  US$ 





1970-2005 GFD  US$ 
Chile  1822-2000  Diaz et. al.  Lcu 
  1970-2005 GFD  US$ 
  1822-1930 RR  Estimated  from 
debentures 
China  1865-1925 RR  Estimated  from 
debentures 
 1981-2005  GFD  US$ 
Colombia  1923-2006  Contraloria General de 
la Republica 
Lcu 
Costa Rica  1892-1914 Soley-Guell  Lcu 
  1914-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2007 CLYPS,  Ministerio  de 
Hacienda 
US$ 
Cote D’Ivoire  1970-2005 GFD  US$ 
Dominican Republic  1914-1952 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1961-2004  Banco de la Republica  US$ 
Ecuador  1914-1972 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1970-2005 GFD  US$ 
`  1990-2007  Ministry of Finance  US$ 
Egypt  1862-1930 RR  Estimated  from 
debebtures 
  1914-1959 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1970-2005 GFD  US$ 
 
 





Table AII.3 External Public Debt-continued 
(currency units are noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
France  1913-1972 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1999-2007  Ministère du Budget, 
des comptes public 
Lcu 
Germany  1914-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
Greece  1920-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
Guatemala  1921-1982 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1970-2005 GFD  US$ 
  1980-2005 CLYPS  US$ 
Honduras  1914-1971 LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1970-2005  GDF  US$ 
 1980-2005   US$ 
Hungary  1913-1942 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1982-2005 GDF  US$ 
  1992-2005  Jeanne & Guscina   
India  1840-1920 Statistical  Abstract 
relating to British India 
 
  1913-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2005  Jeanne & Guscina   
Indonesia  1972-1983 UN  Lcu 
  1970-2005 GDF  US$ 
Italy  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1914-1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1982-2007 Dipartamento  del 
Tesoro 
Lcu 
Japan  1872-2007  Historical Statistics of 
Japan/Bank of Japan 
Lcu 
  1910-1938  Mizoguchi & Umemura  Yen 
Kenya  1961-1980 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1970-2005 GDF  US$ 
  1997-2007  Central Bank of Kenya  Lcu 
Korea  1970-1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1970-2005  GDF  US$ 
  1990-2004  Jeanne & Guscina  US$ 
Malaysia  1947-1957 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1976-1981    
  1970-2005 GDF  US$ 
  1980-2004  Jeanne & Guscina   
Mauritius  1970-1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1970-2005 GDF  US$ 
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Table AII. External Public Debt-continued 
(currency units are noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Mexico  1814-1946 Bazant  Not continuous 
 1820-1930  RR  Estimated  from 
debentures 
 1914-1979  LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1970-2005 GDF  US$ 
  1980-2006  Direccion General de la 
Deuda Publica 
 
Morocco  1965-1980 UN  Lcu 
  1970-2005 GDF  US$ 
Netherlands  1880-1914  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1914-1977 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1914-2008  Dutch State Treasury 
Agency 
Lcu 
New Zealand  1858-2006 Statistics  New 
Zealand/NZ Treasury  
Lcu 
Nicaragua  1914-1945 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1970-1983    
  1970-2005 GDF  US$ 
  1991-2005 CLYPS  US$ 
Norway  1880-1914  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1913-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1965-2007  Ministry of Finance  Lcu 
Panama  1915-1983 LofN/UN  US$ 
  1980-2005 CLYPS  US$ 
Paraguay  1927-1947 
1976-1982 
LofN/UN Lcu 
  1970-2005 GFD  US$ 
  1990-2004 CLYPS  US$ 
     
Peru  1822-1930 RR  Estimated  from 
debentures 
  1918-1970 LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1990-2005  CLYPS  US$ 
  1970-2005 GFD  US$ 
Philippines  1948-1982 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1970-2005 GFD  US$ 
Poland  1920-1947 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1986-2005 GFD  US$ 
Portugal  1851-1997 INE-Portugese 
Statistical Agency  
 
 1914-1975  LofN/UN    Lcu 
  1980-2007  Banco de Portugal  In euros from 1999 
Russia  1815-1917 RR   
 1922-1938  LofN/UN    Lcu 
  1993-2005  Jeanne & Guscina   
Singapore  1969-1982 UN  Lcu 
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Table AII.3 External Public Debt-concluded 
(currency units are noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
South Africa  1859-1914 Page  UK  pounds 
  1910-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1946-2006 South  Africa  Reserve 
Bank 
Lcu 
Spain  1850-2001 Estadisticas  Historicas 
de España: Siglos XIX-
XX 
Lcu 
  1999-2006  Banco de España  Euro 
Sri Lanka  1950-1983 UN  Lcu 
  1970-2005 GFD  US$ 
  1990-2006  Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka 
Lcu 
Sweden  1914-1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1950-2006 Riksgälden Lcu 
Thailand (Siam)  1913-1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1970-2005 GFD  US$ 
  1980-2006  Jeanne & Guscina, Bank 
of Thailand 
Lcu 
Tunisia  1970-2005 GFD  US$ 
  2004-2007  Central Bank of Tunisia  Lcu 
  1972-1982 LofN/UN  Lcu 
Turkey  1854-1933 RR  Estimated  from 
debentures  
 1933-1984  LofN/UN    Lcu 
 1970-2005  GFD  US$ 
 1986-2007  Turkish  Treasury  US$ 
United Kingdom  1914-2007 LofN/UN  Lcu 





  1970-2005 GFD  US$ 
  1980-2004 CLYPS  US$ 
Venezuela  1822-1842 RR  Estimated  from 
debentures, US $ 
  1914-1982 LofN/UN  Lcu 
Zambia  1970-2005 GFD   
Zimbabwe  1969-1982 UN  Lcu 
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Table AII.4 Domestic Public Debt 
(Local currency units unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Argentina  1863-1971 Garcia  Vizcaino  Lcu 
  1914-1981 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2005  GFD, Jeanne & Guscina   
Australia  1914-1981 LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1980-2007  Australian  Office  of 
Financial Management 
Lcu 
Austria  1945-1984 UN  Lcu 
  1970-2006 Austrian  Federal 
Financing Agency 
euros 
Belgium  1914-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1992-2007 BNB,  Centre  d'études 
économiques de la KUL 
 
Bolivia  1914-1953 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1968-1981    
  1991-2004 CLYPS  US$ 
Brazil  1923-1972 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1991-2005  GFD, Jeanne & Guscina   
Canada  1867-2007  Statistics Canada, Bank 
of Canada 
Lcu 
Chile  1827-2000  Diaz et. al.  Lcu 
  1914-1953 LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1914-1946  UN   
  1990-2007  Ministerio de Hacienda  US$ 
China  1894-1949  RR (from Cheng, 
Huang, UN) 
Lcu 
    
Colombia  1923-2006  Contraloria General de 
la Republica 
Lcu 
Costa Rica  1892-1914 Soley-Guell  Lcu 
  1914-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2007 CLYPS,  Ministerio  de 
Hacienda 
US$ 
Cote D’Ivoire  1970-1980 UN  Lcu 
Denmark  1914-1975 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1990-2007 Danmark’s  National 
Bank 
Lcu 
Dominican Republic  1914-1952 LofN/UN  Lcu 
Ecuador  1914-1972 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1990-2006  Ministry of Finance  US$ 
Egypt  1914-1959 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  2001-2005  Ministry of Finance  Lcu 
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Table AII.4 Domestic Public Debt-continued 
(Local currency units unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
France  1913-1972 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1999-2007  Ministère du Budget, 
des comptes public 
Lcu 
Greece  1920-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1912-1941 UN   
Guatemala  1921-1982 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2005 CLYPS  US$ 
Honduras  1914-1971 LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1980-2005   US$ 
Hungary  1913-1942 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1992-2005  Jeanne & Guscina   
India  1840-1920 Statistical  Abstract 
relating to British India 
 
  1913-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2005  Jeanne & Guscina   
Indonesia  1972-1983 UN  Lcu 
  1998-2005 Bank  Indonesia/GDF   
Italy  1880-1913  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1914-1894 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1882-2007 Dipartamento  del 
Tesoro 
Lcu 
Japan  1872-2007  Historical Statistics of 
Japan/Bank of Japan 
Lcu 
  1914-1946 UN   
Kenya  1961-1980 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1997-2007  Central Bank of Kenya  Lcu 
Korea  1970-1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1990-2004  Jeanne & Guscina  Lcu 
Malaysia  1947-1957 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1976-1981    
  1980-2004  Jeanne & Guscina   
Mauritius  1970-1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1998-2007  Bank of Mauritius  Lcu 
Mexico  1814-1946 Bazant  Not continuous 
 1914-1979  LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2006  Direccion General de la 
Deuda Publica 
 
Morocco  1965-1980 UN  Lcu 
Netherlands  1880-1914  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1914-1977 LofN/UN  Lcu 
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Table AII.4 Domestic Public Debt-continued 
(Local currency units unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
New Zealand  1858-2006 Statistics  New 
Zealand/NZ Treasury 
Lcu 
Nicaragua  1914-1945 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1970-1983    
  1991-2005 CLYPS  US$ 
Norway  1880-1914  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1913-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1965-2007  Ministry of Finance  Lcu 
Panama  1915-1983 LofN/UN  US$ 
  1980-2005 CLYPS  US$ 
Paraguay  1927-1947 
1976-1982 
LofN/UN Lcu 
  1990-2004 CLYPS  US$ 
Peru  1918-1970 LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1990-2005  CLYPS  US$ 
Philippines  1948-1982 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2005  GFD, Jeanne & Guscina   
Poland  1920-1947 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1994-2004  Jeanne & Guscina  Lcu 
Portugal  1851-1997 INE-Portugese 
Statistical Agency  
Lcu 
 1914-1975  LofN/UN    Lcu 
  1980-2007  Banco de Portugal  In euros from 1999 
Russia  1922-1938 LofN/UN   Lcu 
  1993-2005  Jeanne & Guscina   
Singapore  1969-1982 UN  Lcu 
  1986-2006 Monetary  Authority  Lcu 
South Africa  1859-1914 Page  UK  pounds 
  1910-1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1946-2006 South  Africa  Reserve 
Bank 
Lcu 
Spain  1850-2001 Estadisticas  Historicas 
de España: Siglos XIX-
XX 
Lcu 
  1999-2006  Banco de España  Euro 
Sri Lanka  1950-1983 UN  Lcu 
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Table AII.4 Domestic Public Debt-concluded 
(Local currency units unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Sweden  1914-1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1950-2006 Riksgälden Lcu 
Thailand (Siam)  1913-1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980-2006  Jeanne & Guscina, Bank 
of Thailand 
Lcu 
    
Tunisia  1972-1982 UN  Lcu 
  2004-2007  Central Bank of Tunisia  Lcu 
Turkey  1933-1984 LofN/UN   Lcu 
 1986-2007  Turkish  Treasury  US$ 
United Kingdom  1914-2007 LofN/UN  Lcu 
United States  1791-2007 Treasury  Direct  Lcu 
Uruguay  1914-1947 
1972-1984 
LofN/UN Lcu 
  1980-2004 CLYPS  US$ 
Venezuela  1914-1982 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1983-2005  Jeanne & Guscina  Lcu 
Zimbabwe  1969-1982 UN  Lcu 
 